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bottleneck to the deployment of lowͲcarbon energy technologies. In order to assess whether such




thedeploymentof the technologies inEuropebetween2020and2030.Thedemandofeachmetal is
compared to the respective globalproduction volume in2010.This ratio (expressed as apercentage)
allowscomparingtherelativestressthatthedeploymentofthesixtechnologiesinEuropeisexpectedto





anticipated demand by analysing in detail the likelihood of rapid future global demand growth,
limitations to expanding supply in the short tomedium term, and the concentration of supply and
political risksassociatedwithkeysuppliers.The reportpinpoints5of the14metals tobeathigh risk,
namely:therareearthmetalsneodymiumanddysprosium,andthebyͲproducts(fromtheprocessingof
othermetals)indium,telluriumandgallium.Thereportexploresasetofpotentialmitigationstrategies,
ranging fromexpandingEuropeanoutput, increasingrecyclingandreusetoreducingwasteand finding
substitutes for thesemetals in theirmain applications. A number of recommendations are provided
whichinclude:








x raising awareness andengaging in an activedialoguewith zinc, copper and aluminium refiners
overbyͲproductrecovery,
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competitivenessof theEuropeaneconomy, theEuropeanUnionhas set the creationof a lowͲcarbon
economyasacentralpolicypriority.TheEUhasthereforecreatedtheStrategicEnergyTechnologyPlan
(SETͲPlan)toenhanceResearch,DevelopmentandDemonstration inkeyLowͲCarbonTechnologiesand




metals are essential formanufacturing lowͲcarbon technologies and Europe depends on imports for















Thedemand formetalshas firstbeen calculated for themostoptimisticdeploymentͲscenario for the
technologies in Europe in order to identify those metals with the greatest usage in the SETͲPlan.
However,absolutevolumesdonotprovidean informativecomparisonbecauseproductionvolumesfor
differentmetalsdiffer considerably. Instead, theaverageannualdemand from thedeploymentof the
technologies inEuropebetween2020and2030foreachmetal isestimatedandthencomparedtothe
globalproductionvolumeofthismetalin2010.Thisratio(expressedasapercentage)allowscomparing
the relative stress that thedeploymentof the six technologies inEurope isexpected tocreateon the














decade foreachof the14metals,by analysing indetail the likelihoodof rapid future globaldemand


























Measuring such future risks is a complex challenge and is not an exact science. The present study
however improves on several existing studies by puttingmore emphasis on actualmarket dynamics,
globalsupplyanddemandforecasts.Thescoringofthesefactorsabstainsfromusingprecisenumericrisk
measures and instead employs a simple lowͲmediumͲhigh scale, to emphasize the largemargins of
uncertaintyassociatedwithsuchassessmentsoffuturedevelopments.Table1showstheresultswhich


















Dysprosium High High High High
High
Neodymium High Medium High High
Tellurium High High Low Medium
Gallium High Medium Medium Medium
Indium Medium High Medium Medium
Niobium High Low High Medium
Medium
Vanadium High Low Medium High
Tin Low Medium Medium High
Selenium Medium Medium Medium Low
Silver Low Medium Low High
Low
Molybdenum Medium Low Medium Medium
Hafnium Low Medium Medium Low
Nickel Medium Low Low Medium





underpressure. In each case, there are also significantobstacles to expandingoutput in the short to
mediumterm,resulting inhighoverallmarketrisk. Inthecaseof therareearths,thesedifficultiesare
related to the commercial and technical challenges inbringingnewmines to themarket. For indium,
telluriumandgallium, it isthebyͲproductcharacterthatposesobstaclestotheexpansionofsupply. in
therareearthscase,thesemarketrisksarecompoundedbyhighpoliticalrisksduetotheconcentration
ofsupply inChina.Political risksare lessprominent for indium, telluriumandgallium,assupply is less
concentratedandineachcasethereissignificantproductionwhichisassociatedwithlowpoliticalrisks.

In the six SETͲPlan technologies, the five, highͲriskmetals aremainly used in variouswind and solar
energygenerationtechnologies,althoughindifferingquantitieswithinthetechnologymix.Thereforean
assessment isconductedofthe impactofvariations intheassumptionsoffuturetechnologyuptake,as
wellasthetechnologymixinthewindandsolarsector,uponthedemandforthefivebottleneckmetals.
It shows that depending on the precise technologymix, demand could vary significantly, indicating a
considerable degree of uncertainty. An important conclusion is that if bottlenecks for particular
technologiesdomaterialise, then alternative technologies are inprinciple able to substitutepotential
bottleneck technologiesandhelp tononethelessachieve theSETͲPlan targets.Forcompanieswhoare
committedtoparticulartechnologies,the implicationsofmetalbottlenecksare likelytobemuchmore
serious.Consequently it is recommended that inorder to increase resilience, theSETͲPlanavoidssuch





Finallyasetofpotentialmitigationstrategies isexplored,ranging fromexpandingEuropeanoutput for
thesemetals,increasingrecyclingandreusetoreducingwasteandfindingsubstitutesforthesemetalsin
theirmainapplications.Theresultsshowthatwhilesomesolutionsarenotrealisticforparticularmetals,





1. Collectmoredataandprovidebetter informationonthedemand,supplyandprice trends
formetals thatareused in significantquantities inSETͲPlan technologies.Bottleneck risks
are reduced by a faster flow of information between decisionͲmakers and market
participants both inmetalmarkets as well as in the consuming industries. This can be
achievedby:




iii. ensuring that any informational actions for the “critical” materials gallium,
indiumandtherareearthsarealsoduplicatedfortellurium,whichfallsoutside
thisgroup.
2. Support and sustain the existing rare earths supply chain in Europe, including efforts to
ensurereliablesupplyoforeconcentratesatcompetitivepricesthrough:
i. feasibilitystudiesonbringingbackintouseandupdatingexistingassets,
ii. R&D and demonstration projects on new, lowerͲcost separation processes,
particularlythosefrombyͲproductortailingscontainingrareearths,
iii. collaboration with other countries/regions with a shared agenda of risk
reduction such as the USA and Japan in exchange of information on
underpinningscienceorinpreͲcompetitiveresearch.














for demonstration projects in hard disc drive and flat panel display disassembly and
recycling,where it isproposedtorecoverhighpercentagesofrareearthsand indium,and
for innovativedesign thatenableseasierandquickerdisassemblywhilst retainingproduct
integrityandfunctionality.
7. Include measures for the implementation of the revised WEEE Directive in order to
encouragerecoveryofsuchlesscommonmetalsalongsidethemainmetalsthatareusually
targetedinmassͲbasedrecoverysystems.
8. Invest broadly in alternative technologies that can provide systemͲlevel substitutes to








electricity storage or fuel cell and hydrogen technologies—which are key to Europe’s green energy


























competitivenessof theEuropeaneconomy, theEuropeanUnionhas set the creationof a lowͲcarbon
economyasacentralpolicypriority.ThedeploymentoflowͲcarbonenergytechnologiesliesattheheart
ofthistransition.TheEUthereforecreatedtheStrategicEnergyTechnologyPlan(SETͲPlan)toaccelerate
the development and large scale deployment of lowͲcarbon energy technologies, drawing upon the









specialitymetalsareessential formanufacturingmany lowͲcarbonenergy technologies,andEurope is
100%importͲdependentformanyofthesemetals.Asdemandgrowsrapidly,limitedglobalsuppliesand
competitionover the controlof resourceshave created concerns that limitedmetal availabilitymight
slow thedeploymentof lowͲcarbon technologies.aParticularmetals identified for inclusionwithin this
studywere bismuth, cadmium, copper, gallium, hafnium, indium, lithium, nickel, niobium, palladium,























Average annual requirements for eachmetal between 2020 and 2030 are then expressed in relative
termsaspercentagesofcurrentworldsupply,toallowacomparisonofthematerialrequirementsofthe






thedeploymentof the sixSETͲPlan technologies inEurope isexpected togenerateanaverageannual
demandbetween2020and2030thatexceeds1%ofcurrentworldsupplyaredefinedassignificant,on
the basis that a usage below 1% of current supply even under themost optimistic uptake scenarios
constitutesaverymarginaldemand.Thedeploymentofthesetechnologiesalsorequiresothermetals,
but theseareneeded insuchsmallquantitiescompared tocurrentworldsupply that theirsourcing is
extremelyunlikelytoconstituteasignificantproblemforthedeploymentofSETͲPlantechnologies.

Highdemand forametaldoesnotnecessarilyconstituteaproblemas it stimulates increasing supply.
Metalsupplyhasexpandedsignificantly inthepastandthereisnoreasontoassumeapriorithatrapid
demand will necessarily constitute a problem. Nonetheless, there is potential for supplyͲchain
bottlenecks to occur which could result in price rises and supply disruptions. This could slow the
deploymentoftheSETͲPlantechnologiesandendangertheachievementofEurope’s2020targets.

The structureand future trends inglobal supplyanddemand foreachof themetals thatareused in








In scoring, a wide range of secondary sources has been considered. Extensive interviews with key
companies and industry expertshavebeen aparticularly valuable sourceof information, as formany
metalsthatwereconsidered,publicsourcesprovideonlyverylimitedinformation,particularlyonmarket
dynamicsandfuturetrends.Asaresultofthisbottleneckmetalswiththehighestrisksforfutureprice
hikes and supplydisruptions are identified. Focusingonmetalswith thehighest risks andparticularly
vulnerabletechnologies, lowandhighscenariosuntil2030havethenbeenexplored indepthtodetect
the vulnerability to metal supplyͲchain bottlenecks for the European deployment of SETͲPlan
technologies including different uptake scenarios of SETͲPlan technologies and different technology
mixeswithinSETͲPlantechnologies.

Finally the study investigateswhat opportunities exist tomitigate potentialmetal bottlenecks in the







Inanumberofways, this studyhasmuch incommonwith thatundertakenby theUSDepartmentof
Energy intheirCriticalMaterialsStrategy(2010),whichassessedtheroleofcertainmetals, intermsof
their importancetocleanenergyandsupplyrisk,bothfortheshortterm(0Ͳ5years)andmediumterm
(5Ͳ15 years). Similarities include the modelling of different technology uptake and technology mix
scenarios,andthetypesofindicatorsusedintheassessmentofsupplyrisk(capturedwithinthisstudyin
the Bottleneck Screening).However the technologies considered in the two studies differ somewhat;
within theUSStudy, the technologies includedwere solar,wind,vehicles (magnetsandbatteries)and
lighting.Asecondmajordifferencewith this is themethodologies foranalysing the importanceof the
metals,withabottomͲupapproachbeingemployedhere toquantifyeachof themetal requirements
ratherthanstartingwitha listofmetalstodiscuss.Finally,theriskassessmentmethodologyemployed









for whichmetals the deployment of these technologies in Europe creates significant
pressureonglobalsupplies.
x Chapter5evaluatestherisksforfuturesupplyͲchainbottlenecksforthegroupofthe14
significant metals, considering a wide range of market and political factors that can
contributetobottleneckrisks.
x Chapter6 setsout the lowͲandhighͲtechnology scenarios to investigate theeffectsof










x Appendix 2:Metal Composition of SETͲPlan Technologies,which set out in detail the





























TheEUhascreated theStrategicEnergyTechnologyPlan (SETͲPlan) tohelpEuropemeet itsambitious
2020 targets for reducingGHGemissions and increasing theEuropeanenergy supply from renewable
















































for electricity production. The longͲterm sustainability of nuclear energy is the main driver of the
EuropeanIndustrialInitiative(EII)onnuclearfission.Inparticular,theEIIisfocusedonanewgeneration
ofreactors–thesoͲcalledGenerationIVnuclearreactor.Suchreactorswilloperateinnewwaysthathave
the capability of exploiting the full energetic potential of uranium, thus greatly extending resource
availabilityby factorsofup to100over current technologies. Theywillmaximise inherent safety and





of Generation III+ fission reactors, it seems highly unlikely that any Generation IV reactors will be
operatingon a commercialbasisby2030.Hence themetals requirements investigated in thisproject
concentratesextensivelyonGenerationIIIandIII+technologiesasdescribedbelow:
x LightWaterReactors–The collectivename for theBoilingWaterReactors (BWRs)and
Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs). Both Westinghouse and Areva favour PWR
technology for their AP1000 and EPR reactors respectively, as doesMitsubishi Heavy








x GasCooledReactors–GCRs (including theUK’sageingAdvancedGasCooledReactors,
AGRs)useagraphitemoderatorandacarbondioxidegascoolant.Aswithheavywater
reactors, natural or slightly enriched uranium is used as a fuel.Worldwide there are
approximately18GCRs inoperation. It isanticipatedthatthesereactors,whichareofa
Generation IIdesign,willceaseoperationbefore2030.NonewGCRsof thisdesignare
planned.
x HighTemperatureGasCooledReactors (HTGCRs) – Thisdesignof reactor isnot yet in









retirement of nuclear reactors has been estimated at 17.7GW between 2011 and 2020, and 20.3GW
between2021and2030.aHowever,engineeringassessmentsofmanyplantshaveestablishedthatlonger
operational livesareacceptable, resulting in licence renewalsextendingoperational lifeby20years in
manycases.About150newreactorsarenowattheadvancedplanningstageand340morehavebeen
proposed,although it isnoted that the recentevents inMarch2011 involving thenuclear reactorsat
FukushimainJapanmayleadtosomeoftheseproposalsbeingrevisited.
 











solarpower (CSP) technologies. The PV component is expected to contributeup to12%of European




PVsystemscollectsunlight throughabsorptionandconversionof sunlight toelectricity.The individual
cells linked together tocreate solarpanelsconsistof layersofmaterialsdesigned toabsorb light,and












applied to the front and rear of the cell,with the front contact pattern specially designed to allow
maximumlightexposureoftheSimaterialwithminimumelectrical(resistive)lossesinthecell.

Each cͲSi cell generates about0.5V,but tobeusefulhigheroutput voltages are required so cells are
usually soldered together in series to produce amodulewith amore useful output. For example, to




Thin film technologies aredeveloped to respond to cost reductionefforts as crystalline siliconwafers
makeupabout26Ͳ30%ofthecostofafinishedmodule.Potentialtoreducethecostissubstantialsince
there isonlyabout1micronthicknesstoabsorbthe light.Themostcommonmaterialsareamorphous








Although thin films are less efficient (productionmodules range from 8 to 11%), they are potentially



























CSP isaterm fortechnologiesthatconcentrate thesun'sraystoheatamedium (usually liquidorgas)
that is thenused inaheatengineprocess (steamorgas turbine) togenerateelectricity,whichcanbe
storedforlateruseorusedtosupplyheatforindustrialprocesses.

Thereare fourmainCSPdesignscurrently inuseat theutilityscale:parabolic troughs, towersystems,
parabolicdishesand linear (Fresnel) troughs.Parabolic troughs currentlyaccount forover90%of the


















Partof theCSPgeneration is storageofelectricity tomake itavailablewhen sunlight isnotavailable.
Thereareanumberofsolutionstothese:d













Asallofthesesolutionsrequirestructuralmaterials,theyhavenotbeen included inthisstudy. In fact,






Wind turbinesgenerateelectricityby capturing thewindenergyasmechanicalenergy throughblades








andoffshorewind,away from thecoast.Thedifferencesare remarkable,due to thedifferentworking
environment (salineand tougher in the sea)and facilityofaccess for installationandmaintenance. In
addition,as thewind is strongerandmore stableat sea,wind turbineelectricityproduction ishigher





stabilisedduring recentyears.Currently landͲbased turbines (98%ofall installedcapacity)aremostly
ratedeitheratthe750–850kW,the1.5–2MWorthe3MWrange.Foroffshoremachineshowever,
both industryandacademiasee largerturbines(10–20MW)asthefuture.Themain linesofresearch
include larger turbines,driveͲtrain innovationsandoffshore installation.Drive research includesdirect
drive, leading to simpler nacelle systems, increased reliability, increased efficiency and absence of
gearbox issues;andhybriddrive trains,generally leading tovery compactdrive.DirectͲdrive solutions
mayusepermanentmagnetsthatcontainrareearthmetals,whichareofinterestforthisstudy,although
other technologies include copper electromagnets and (not yet commercial) High Temperature
Superconductor(HTS)systems.
 
TheEuropeanWind Initiative (EWI) is the technology roadmap to reduce the costofwindenergy. Its
implementation will help improve the competitiveness of the industry by ensuring the largeͲscale




x to make onshore wind the most competitive energy source by 2020 with offshore
followingby2030












thedesignofbiomassboilersdiffers to thoseused for fossil fuel combustion, themetalsand scaleof
equipmentissimilar,thereforenometalsupplyissuesareexpected.

Biofuels (sometimesdenotedasagrofuels tomake reference tobiofuels fromagricultureand forestry)








Several heterogeneous catalysts have been employed in the biodiesel production, for example
magnesiumoxide,calciumoxideandhydrotalcites.FischerͲTropschcatalystsareverywellknownforthe
syngas synthesis to produce diesels and gasoline. These catalysts are relevant if the fuel sources are
biomassbased.Themost common FischerͲTropsch catalystsuseGroupVIIIMetals (cobalt, ruthenium
and iron). Iron catalystsare commonlyusedbecauseof their low costs in comparison tootheractive




The European Industrial Initiative on bioenergy addresses the technical and economic barriers to the
















Three alternative technologies for CO2 capture are currently being tested for potential commercial
application,eachusingadifferentmechanismtocaptureCO2emissions:
x PreͲcombustion technology– In the firstplace the fossil fuel is converted to syngas (a
mixtureofcarbonmonoxideandhydrogen),whichisthen‘shifted’toCO2andH2priorto






x PostͲcombustion technology – this technology removes the CO2 from the flue gas
emissions generated during the combustion process. The CO2 is most commonly
sequestered by absorption with an amineͲbased solvent. Desorption then occurs by
alteringtheconditionsandtheCO2separatesoff.Thesolventcanbecycledrepeatedlyin
acontinuousprocess.
x OxyͲcombustion – thismethod requires combustion to take place with pure oxygen,
generatingafluegascompositionofalmostpureCO2.ThistechnologyrequiresanonͲsite
















inthedeepoceans (eitherdispersed inthewaterorasa lakeunderpressure)ormineralcarbonation.
Bothoftheseoptionsareattheexperimentalstage.

In addition to the technologies directly associatedwith CCS, improvements to the energy generation
efficiency of turbines are also likely to be implemented as a result of CCS. CCS utilises a significant
proportionofthetotalenergyoutputofpowergeneration(currentestimatesarebetween10to40%).




TheobjectiveoftheEuropean Industrial Initiativeoncarboncaptureandstorage istodemonstratethe
commercial viabilityofCCS technologies inaneconomicenvironmentdrivenby theemissions trading
scheme.Inparticular, itaimstoenabletheircostͲcompetitivedeployment incoalͲfiredpowerplantsby
2020or soon thereafter,and to furtherdevelopCCSͲtechnologies toallow for their subsequentwideͲ
spreaduseinallcarbonͲintensiveindustrialsectors.

Targets in the SETͲPlan aim at 3,600MW of power generation, via demonstration plants, to be CCSͲ






TheobjectiveoftheEuropean Industrial Initiativeonelectricitygrids istoenablethetransmissionand
distributionofupto35%ofelectricityfromdispersedandconcentratedrenewablesourcesby2020,and
a completely decarbonised electricity production by 2050. This is to be achieved through further





x greater use of ICT tomonitor andmanage flows of electricity in the transmission and
distributiongridandinthehomeenvironment;
x adaptionof thedistribution and transmission grid to greaterproportionsof renewable
energyandgreaterdistributedenergygeneration;
x investments in the power transmission grid to enable connectivity to new generation
assets,andbetweencountriesandregions.

Controlandmanagement systems,often referred toas the “smart” contribution, i.e. SmartElectricity
Grid, incorporateconventional ICTmaterials found incomputersandtelecommunicationsequipment–
















For 2020, it is likely that high voltageAC (HVAC) cableswill only be constructed using an aluminium
conductor and a conventional steel cabling core to provide tensile strength.a Future developments
include carbonͲfibre cores to increase the lightnessof the cable andhence enable greater spacingof
supportingpylons.Monitoringtechniquesusingfibreopticsareunderdevelopmenttomonitorthesagof
cables,whichincreaseswithtemperature,andhencetooptimisethecurrentcarryingcapacityoftheline




Submarine cables are required for increasing offshore wind capacity, also for certain large scale
international interconnector projects such as those proposed for the North Sea and for the
Mediterranean. These cablesmay be AC, although there is increasing use ofHVDC for long distance
submarine cables, and this trend is expected to continue.However there is little difference inmetal
requirements between the two approaches: copper or aluminium conductors may be used, or a
combination of the two. In addition, a coppermesh surrounding the insulatorsmay be used. Lead
sheathinghasbeentraditionallyusedtohelpprotectsubmarinecableintegrity,althoughitnowexistsin
competitionwithplasticsheathings.






Demonstration projects have existed for some time using conventional high temperature superͲ
conductors.Theconsensusviewofresearchersandcommercialorganisationsisthatsuperconductorswill
havevery limitedpenetrationof thepowercablemarketby2020.Applicationswillbe limited tohigh











This Chapter has provided an overview of the SETͲPlan for the implementation of renewable energy













that each of the technologies have different components, each of which has their different metal
requirements.Additionally,anumberof the technologieshaveanumberofpossible subͲtechnologies
thatwillcollectivelycontributetowardsachievingtheSETͲPlan.AseachofthesesubͲtechnologieshave























SETͲPlan technologies,creatingan inventoryofallof themetals required foreachof the technologies
thathavebeendiscussedinthepreviousChapter.Thebroadestpossiblerangeofmetalswasconsidered
atthisstagetoensurecomprehensivecoverageaheadofthescreeningprocess:60metallicelementsin
all–only iron,aluminiumand radioactiveelementswereexcluded.Table2givesdetailsof themetals
considered and required for each SETͲPlan technology, as indicated by the research presented in
Appendix2.Thosemetalsthathavebeentickedinbracketsdenoteverysmalloroccasionalusagewhich
has not been quantified.With respect to rare earthmetals (REM) and the platinum group ofmetals
(PGM),Table3providesalistoftheseseparatemetalsandtheirusagesinwindandbiofuelsrespectively.

Nuclear fission was the technology with the greatest number of required metals at 17; conversely
ElectricityGridshadthefewestat2.Itwasnotedthatanumberofthemetalshadusesacrossmorethan
one SETͲPlan technology, for example copper (five technologies), molybdenum and nickel (four






metal requirements of each subͲtechnology and their individual components,which can be found in












of theSETͲPlan technologies is calculatedand finds thatmetal requirements in this scenarioaremost
demanding between 2020 and 2030. However, these absolute volumes are not a usefulmetric for
comparison because global production volumes for metals differ considerably ranging from tens of
millionsof tonnes for somemetals to less thanahundred tonnesperannum forothers. Instead, the
additional average annualdemand from thedeploymentof SETͲPlan technologies in Europe between
2020and2030foreachmetalinthisoptimisticscenarioiscomparedtotheglobalproductionvolumeof
thismetal in 2010. This ratio (expressed as apercentage) allows comparing the relative stressof the




The results show that the deployment of SETͲPlan technologies in Europe creates very different
challengesfordifferentmetals.Forsome,theaverageannualdemandbetween2020and2030fromthe
deploymentofSETͲPlan technologies inEuropehasanegligible impacton theglobaldemand for that




ElementName Symbol Nuclear Solar Wind Biofuels CCS Grids
Antimony Sb 8 8 8 8 8 8
Barium Ba 8 8 8 8 8 8
Beryllium Be 8 8 8 8 8 8
Bismuth Bi 8 8 8 8 8 8
Cadmium Cd 9 9 8 8 8 8
Calcium Ca 8 8 8 8 8 8
Caesium Cs 8 8 8 8 8 8
Chromium Cr 9 8 9 8 9 8
Cobalt Co 9 8 8 9 9 8
Copper Cu 9 9 9 8 9 9
Gallium Ga 8 9 8 8 8 8
Germanium Ge 8 9 8 8 8 8
Gold Au 8 8 8 8 8 8
Hafnium Hf 9 8 8 8 (9) 8
Indium In 9 9 8 8 8 8
Lead Pd 9 8 8 8 8 9
Lithium Li 8 8 8 8 8 8
Magnesium Mg 8 8 8 8 8 8
Manganese Mn 8 8 9 8 9 8
Molybdenum Mo 9 8 9 8 9 8
Nickel Ni 9 8 9 (9) 9 8
Niobium Nb 9 8 8 8 9 8
PlatinumGroup PGM 8 8 8 9 8 8
Potassium K 8 8 8 8 8 8
RareEarthElements REE 8 8 9 8 8 8
Rhenium Re (9) 8 8 8 (9) 8
Rubidium Rb 8 8 8 8 8 8
Scandium Sc 8 8 8 8 8 8
Selenium Se 8 9 8 8 8 8
Silver Ag 9 9 8 8 8 8
Sodium Na 8 8 8 8 8 8
Strontium Sr 8 8 8 8 8 8
Tantalum Ta 8 8 8 8 (9) 8
Tellurium Te 8 9 8 8 8 8
Thallium Tl 8 8 8 8 8 8
Tin Sn 9 9 8 8 8 8
Titanium Ti 9 8 8 8 8 8
Tungsten W 9 8 8 8 8 8
Vanadium V 9 8 8 8 9 8
Yttrium Y 9 8 8 8 (9) 8
Zinc Zn 8 8 8 8 8 8





RareEarthElements Symbol Wind  PlatinumGroupMetals Symbol Biofuels
Lanthanum La 8  Ruthenium Ru 9
Cerium Ce 8  Rhodium Rh 8
Praseodymium Pr (9)  Palladium Pd 8
Neodymium Nd 9  Osmium Os 8
Samarium Sm 8  Iridium Ir 8
Europium Eu 8  Platinum Pt 8
Gadolinium Gd 8     
Terbium Tb (9)     
Dysprosium Dy 9     
Holmium Ho 8     
Erbium Er 8     
Thulium Tm 8     
Ytterbium Yb 8     




In this section themetal requirements of each of the SETͲPlan technologies is quantified using the
functional units discussed in the previous section. Full details on these calculations can be found in
Appendix2.AsummaryofthekeyreferencesandassumptionscanbefoundintheAppendix,foreachof
the SETͲPlan technologies in turn.Thequantificationby functionalunits thenenabled the totalmetal
requirements tobecalculated for thedifferentuptakescenariosofeachSETͲPlan technology. Inorder
not to exclude any important metals, the most optimistic projections for technology uptake were
modelled in the screeningprocess (seeAppendix1 formoredetails), and compared to currentworld
supplyof themetal. Foreach technology, the reference scenario for2010 from theEuropeanEnergy
Outlookwasused as the startingpoint.Themain sourceused for the supplydatawasUSGSMineral





it is likely that world production of the relevantmetals will grow as demand increases.b Therefore
comparingthemostoptimisticdemandscenariofortheSETͲPlantechnologieswithcurrentworldsupply
providesacriterionthat ismuchmore likelytooverestimateratherthantounderestimatetherisksfor
potential supply shortfalls. Where European average annual demand from SETͲPlan technologies
between2020and2030isestimatedtoexceed1%ofcurrentworldsupply,theadditionaldemandfora
specificmetal from thedeploymentof these technologies isclassifiedas significant.While there isno
‘natural’choiceforsuchathreshold,usagebelow1%ofcurrentsupplyevenunderthemostoptimistic
uptakescenariosconstitutesaverymarginaldemandandishighlyunlikelytomateriallyimpactonfuture
deployment of the six SETͲPlan technologies. All metals for which this method detects significant
additionaldemandfromthedeploymentofthesixSETͲPlantechnologies inEuropearesubjecttomore
inͲdepthscrutinyinthefollowingChapter.




























2020 2030 2020 2030
Hf 0.082 0.48 0.004 0.006 5.2% 7.0%
In 1.35 1.6 0.01 0.02 1.0% 1.4%
Ag 22 8.3 0.07 0.10 0.3% 0.4%
Mo 234 70.8 0.6 0.8 0.3% 0.4%
Ni 1,550 255.5 2.3 3.0 0.1% 0.2%
W 61 5.0 0.04 0.06 <0.1% <0.1%
Y 8.9 0.5 0.004 0.006 <0.1% <0.1%
Nb 63 2 0.02 0.02 <0.1% <0.1%
Zr 1,190 30.5 0.3 0.4 <0.1% <0.1%
Cd 22 0.5 0.005 0.006 <0.1% <0.1%
Cr 22,000 426.7 3.8 5.1 <0.1% <0.1%
Sn 261 4.6 0.04 0.05 <0.1% <0.1%
V 56 0.6 0.005 0.007 <0.1% <0.1%
Cu 16,200 59.6 0.5 0.7 <0.1% <0.1%
Pb 4,100 4.3 0.04 0.05 <0.1% <0.1%
Ti 5,720 1.5 0.01 0.02 <0.1% <0.1%














not insignificant rawmetals requirementswithin crystalline silicon for tin (9.6%) and silver (4.7%), in
2030.Additionally, the sensitivityanalysison the solar technologymixhighlighted that selenium (also












2020 2030 2020 2030
Te 0.50 4.7 0.04 0.25 8.1% 50.4%
In 1.35 4.5 0.04 0.24 2.9% 18.0%
Sn 261 463.1 4.03 25.01 1.5% 9.6%
Ag 22 19.2 0.17 1.04 0.8% 4.7%
Ga 0.16 0.12 0.001 0.006 0.6% 3.9%
Cd 22 6.1 0.05 0.33 0.2% 1.5%
Se 3.25 0.5 0.004 0.026 0.1% 0.8%
Cu 16,200 2194.1 19.09 118.48 0.1% 0.7%
Pb 4,100 269.3 2.34 14.54 <0.1% 0.4%
WorldSupply2010Data:USGS,exceptIn&Ga(USDoE2010),Hf(owncalculationfromRpskill)














2020 2030 2020 2030
















wind capacityof230GW for2020and400GW for2030.Using these calculations, the largestmetals
requirementsfor2030asapercentageof2010worldsupplyarefortherareearthelementsdysprosium
(4.0%) and neodymium (3.8%), which are used in permanent magnet generators (PMG) and for
molybdenum(1.0%),whichisusedasasteelalloyingelement.
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2020 2030 2020 2030
Dy 1.2 2.8 0.03 0.05 2.5% 4.0%
Nd 18 40.6 0.43 0.69 2.4% 3.8%
Mo 234 136.6 1.95 2.32 0.8% 1.0%
Ni 1,550 663.4 9.46 11.28 0.6% 0.7%
Cu 16,200 1142.9 16.13 19.43 <0.1% 0.1%
Cr 22,000 902.4 12.83 15.34 <0.1% <0.1%
Mn 13,000 80.5 1.18 1.37 <0.1% <0.1%
WorldSupply2010Data:USGS,exceptforDy&Nd(USDoE2010)










ThemetalsrequirementsforCCSarepresented inTable8.As little isknownaboutthemetalsrequired
withinCCS, themetalsdemand (kg/MWof fossil fuelgeneration fittedwithCCS)hasbeen calculated
based upon assumptions on the additional high specification steel alloys needed to upgrade existing
generators.Forthepipelines,thecompositionsofthesteelshavebeenmodelledonthosecurrentlyused















2020 2030 2020 2030
V 56 100 0.080 0.730 0.1% 1.3%
Nb 63 100 0.080 0.730 0.1% 1.2%
Ni 1,550 1,145 0.926 8.336 <0.1% 0.5%
Mn 13,000 3,761 3.011 27.380 <0.1% 0.2%
Co 88 7.5 0.006 0.055 <0.1% <0.1%
Cu 16,200 692 0.559 5.034 <0.1% <0.1%
Mo 234 7.5 0.006 0.055 <0.1% <0.1%





Theuptake assumptionsmodelled are the JRCͲSETIS (2009)MaximumpotentialPenetration Scenario,





















2020 2030 2020 2030
Cu 16,200 8,200 78.72 N/A 0.5% N/A










activemetal, the catalysts typically contain anumberof ‘promoters’ includingpotassium and copper.
CatalystsaresupportedonhighͲsurfaceͲareabinders/supportssuchassilica,aluminaorzeolites.Cobalt






0.15 tonnesbiofuelsproductperm3 catalystsperhourwere taken.The lifetime for the catalyst is10
years.cTheresultsofthecalculationsareshowninTable10.Asshown,cobalthasnosignificantdemand
and rutheniumdemand increasesbyonlyaround2Ͳ3%eachyear.However, theproductionofbiofuel
displacestheproductionoffossilͲderivedfuelusingthesamecatalysts;henceforthatreason,eventhis












2020 2030 2020 2030
Ru 0.03 0.12 0.001 0.001 1.8% 2.7%







To take into account crossͲtechnology sensitivities, the metals requirements of the six SETͲPlan
technologiesneedtobeaddedtogether.Theresultsofthisareshown inFigure2andTable11,which
havebeenorderedbytheestimatedaverageannualmetalsrequirementsfor2020Ͳ2030,asapercentage
ofcurrentworldsupply.Anymetalswithrequirements fromtheSETͲPlan in2030accounting formore
than1%ofcurrentworldsupplywereselectedforfurtheranalysis.This1%cutͲoffwasselectedonthe
basisthatausagebelow1%ofcurrentsupplyevenunderthemostoptimisticuptakescenarioconstitutes
a verymarginal demand. The Chapter has demonstrated that deployment of these technologies also
requiresothermetals,buttheseareneeded insuchsmallquantitiescomparedtocurrentworldsupply
that theirsourcing isextremelyunlikely toconstituteasignificantproblem for thedeploymentofSETͲ
Plantechnologies.
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however, it is likely to implymoreofamajorchallenge for suppliers.Forexample,more than90%of







only thedemandgenerated from thedeploymentofPV thinͲfilm technology inEurope.Note that this












































It is therefore noted that the deployment of SETͲPlan technologies can create some pressure on the






















2020 2030 2020 2030
1 Te 0.50 0.04 0.25 8.1% 50.4%
2 In 1.35 0.05 0.26 3.9% 19.4%
3 Sn 261 4.07 25.06 1.6% 9.6%
4 Hf 0.082 0.00 0.01 5.2% 7.0%
5 Ag 22 0.26 1.16 1.2% 5.2%
6 Dy 1.20 0.03 0.05 2.5% 4.0%
7 Ga 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.6% 3.9%
8 Nd 18 0.43 0.69 2.4% 3.8%
9 Cd 22 0.06 0.34 0.3% 1.5%
10 Ni 1,550 12.65 22.66 0.8% 1.5%
11 Mo 234 2.58 3.22 1.1% 1.4%
12 V 56 0.09 0.74 0.2% 1.3%
13 Nb 63 0.10 0.75 0.2% 1.2%
14 Cu 16,200 36.30 143.65 0.2% 0.9%
15 Se 3.3 0.00 0.03 0.1% 0.8%
16 Pb 4,100 2.38 14.59 <0.1% 0.4%
17 Mn 13,000 4.19 28.75 <0.1% 0.2%
18 Co 88 0.03 0.10 <0.1% 0.1%
19 Cr 22,000 16.88 22.80 <0.1% 0.1%
20 W 61 0.04 0.06 <0.1% <0.1%
21 Y 8.9 0.00 0.01 <0.1% <0.1%
22 Zr 1,190 0.27 0.36 <0.1% <0.1%
















The findings of Chapter 4 demonstrate that SETͲPlan technologies rely on awide variety of different
metals. The results further show that to realise the SETͲPlan targets for the introduction of these
technologiesuntil2030,14ofthesemetalsarerequiredinsignificantquantitiesrelativetotheircurrent





targets. Inthiscontext, it is importanttonotethatsignificantSETͲPlandemandsforaspecificmetalon












A good example of how disruptive such bottlenecks can be is the case of rare earths. Given the
challenging economic and technical obstacles involved in opening new rare earthsmines, supply has
struggled to grow considerably even though demand has been booming over the past decade.b In
parallel, China has been systematically tightening export quotas that favour domestic rareͲearth
consuming industriesovercompetitors intherestoftheworld,resulting in2010, inatightmarketand
drivingupprices.China implemented strictmeasures to consolidate aweakly regulated industrywith
many smallͲscaleoperations that routinely ignore safety,environmentalandexport regulations;anda
temporaryhaltofrareearthexportstoJapanwasimposedtoexertpoliticalpressureinthecontextofa






It isnoteasytoevaluatetheriskofsuchsupplyͲchainbottlenecksoccurringfor individualmetals inthe
future.Althoughseveralapproacheshavebeendevelopedoverthepastyears tomeasuresuchsupply
risks,awidelyacceptedmethoddoesnotexist.Table12below, lists the factorsused toassesssupply
risks in severalprominentstudies.e Itshows thatwhileseveral factorsare taken intoaccountbymost
studies,manyfactorsarealsousedonlybyasinglestudy,suchasforexample,leadͲtimesforexpanding
supplyorvulnerabilitytoclimatechange.Furthermore,thesamefactorsareutiliseddifferently:thereis
















Many of these studies then also use different scoring systems in their results about the supply risks
concerningdifferentmetals.Inordertomakethesecomparable,theresultsfromindividualstudieshave
beenconvertedtoasimplelowͲmediumͲhighscale(Table12).Inadditiontoanydisagreementsonwhich
factors constitute supply risk and using the appropriatemeasurementmethod, inconsistencies in the
results are also likely to reflect a high degree of uncertainty about future supply and demand
developments and limited availability of readily accessible data on supply risk factors for individual
metals.Additionally,becausemuchofthescoringwithinthestudies isrelative,forexample,comparing
the risks of onemetal against the others, the assessments in part depend upon themetals analysed




























































Cadmium N/A N/A N/A N/A Medium
Dysprosium High High Medium High N/A
Gallium Low Medium High High Medium
Hafnium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Indium High Medium High High Medium
Molybdenum N/A Low N/A N/A Medium
Neodymium High High Medium High N/A
Nickel N/A Low N/A N/A High
Niobium N/A Medium N/A High High
Selenium N/A N/A N/A N/A Medium
Silver N/A Low N/A N/A High
Tellurium Medium Low Medium N/A Medium
Tin N/A N/A N/A N/A High















risk scale, insteadof anumeric composite indicator, inorder to avoid themisleading impressionof a
precise quantitative assessment of the risks for future bottlenecks. In the eyes of the authors, such
preciseestimatesaredifficult tomakedue to the complex setofdynamic factors that simultaneously












factors for futuredemandand supplydevelopments,by themselves theyare insufficient toeffectively
assess the shortͲ andmediumͲterm evolution of this supplyͲdemand balance.However, supplyͲchain
bottlenecks result from the dynamic interplay of supply and demand and only occurwhen demand
outpacessupplyforsometime.aLackofsubstitutes,limitedrecyclingpotentialandlowknownreserves,
for example, do not necessarily imply that mine supply will be unable to meet demand, if major
explorationprojectsareonthewayanddemandgrowthcanbemetfromexistingsources.(Theissuesof
expanding primary output, recycling and substitution are all discussed further in Chapter 7 under
MitigationStrategies).

In contrast tomanyof theearlier studies, theapproach takenhere is therefore to focusexplicitlyon
global demand and supply trends to identify bottleneck risks. The first two criteria used to evaluate
bottleneck risksaimexplicitly tocapture thesesupplyanddemanddynamics that increasechances for
supplyͲchainbottlenecksoccurring.

First,bottlenecks aremore likely tooccurwhere globaldemand for ametal is forecasted to increase
rapidly, because it creates upward pressure on prices, depletes inventories and stretches existing
supplies. Inthepresentstudy,the likelihoodofrapidglobaldemandgrowthoverthecomingdecade is





new applicationswith an uncertain future; nonetheless clear differences emerge betweenmetals for




which global demand is projected to expand at a rapid pace (for example neodymium) or forwhich
relativelyslowgrowthisexpected(forexamplecadmium).








forecasts from industry sources. Such forecasts typically evaluate the capacity of existing projects,




particularmetal (rather than adding or averaging the two criteria in someway). This is because by



















as metalͲpages.com, actually represent expert estimates of representative prices in trades being
executedonaparticularday,whicharecompiled through recurring interviewswith individual traders.
Giventheirsmallsizeandopaquenature,marketandpriceforecastsforthesemetalsinmanycasesdo
not exist, are not publicly available or are of questionable reliability, for example, where they are




Beyond these market dynamics, political factors can also exacerbate risks for future supplyͲchain
bottlenecks.ThecrossͲcountryconcentrationofsupply isacrucial indicator inthisregard,becauseonly
where the structure of supply ismonopolistic or dominated by only a few players, individual large
suppliercountrieshavesufficientmarketpowertoaffectglobalpricelevelsandaggregatesupplythrough
policy decisions. If supply is diversified, other producers are easily able to expand their capacity in
response toan individualproducer raisingpricesor reducingexportoroutput.The third risk criterion
evaluatessupplyconcentrationashigh,mediumorlow.

If supply is significantly concentrated, a range of political dynamics can potentially affect markets.
Evaluatingpoliticalriskrelatedtomajorsupplyingcountries istherefore important inevaluatingriskfor
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future supplyͲchain bottlenecks. Broader political instability or internal conflicts in amajor supplying
countrymayreduceordelayinvestmentsordisruptproductionandcanhavesignificantimpactonglobal
productioncapacity.Politicaldisputesaroundthelicensing,ownershiporenvironmentalpermitsoflargeͲ
scalemining operations inmajor supplying countries,might have a similar effect. Further, states can
interveneinproductionandpricingdecisions,forexample,inanefforttomaximiserevenueovertimeor





metals.Finally, it isalsopossible thatcountriesuse theirpoweras suppliersas strategicbargaining in




very difficult to measure these risks. The approach taken here follows the criticality study of the
EuropeanCommission,by focusingon composite indicatorsmeasuring ‘goodgovernance’andpolitical
stability, such as theWorld Banks’ Governance Indicator or the Failed State Index. They serve as Ͳ
admittedlyverycrudeͲproxiesformeasuringthepoliticalstabilityofkeysuppliersandtheirinclination
to interveneheavyͲhandedly inmarketprocesses,which,dependingon the scoreson these scales for
majorproducersareagainscoredaslow,mediumorhigh.

It is important to stress that the risk for supplyͲchain bottlenecks to occur due to such political
interventionsremainscontingentonbothsupplyconcentrationandalsooverallmarketconditions.Thisis
because ifsignificantexcessproductioncapacityexists, it is likelytobeverydifficult,evenforrelatively







Table13providesanoverviewofeachof the factorsused toevaluate the risk for futuresupplyͲchain
bottlenecksfor individualmetalsandtherationaleforusingthefactor.Thethirdandfourthcolumnof





In linewith theabovediscussion,market risksaredetermined through thesimultaneousevaluationof
thelikelihoodofrapiddemandgrowthandtheextentoflimitationsonexpandingsupplyintheshortor
medium term.Market risksareconsideredashigh, ifoneorboth factorsarescoredashigh,with the
others being scored at least as medium. Market risks are considered as medium, if both factors
individually score asmedium; otherwise,market risks are considered as low. As has been explained
above,political interventions areonly likely to impactbottleneck risksunder tightmarket conditions.
Therefore,marketrisksareconsideredasdominantintheevaluationofrisksforsupplyͲchainbottlenecks
and political risks are given less weight in the overall assessment. In evaluating political risks,
concentrationofsupply isconsideredtobedominant,withthepoliticalrisk factoronlycontributingto
overallbottleneckriskifconcentrationofsupplyismediumorhigh.
































































































































lowby industryexperts.cLarge reserves representconsiderablepotential for futureproduction.dWhile
cadmium isabyͲproductof zinc refining, cadmium recycling is increasingand industry sourcesexpect
producerstostrugglewithovercapacity inthe industry.Limitationsonexpandingoutput intheshortto
mediumtermarethereforescoredas low.Cadmiumproduction isnotveryconcentrated,withthetop
threeproducingcountriesaccountingforlessthanhalfoftherefineryproductionin2010.eConcentration

















Cadmium Low Low Low Medium Low
 
5.4.2 Dysprosium
Demandgrowth fordysprosium is forecasted tobeverystrongby industrysources,due tocompeting
pressuresforrareearthmagnets.Thelikelihoodforrapidglobaldemandgrowthoverthecomingfiveto
tenyears isthereforescoredashigh.Thereareconsiderablereservesavailableandseveralrareearths
projects are under development.g Nonetheless, the limitations to expand production in the short to
medium term are scored as high, due to the long lead times and complex commercial and technical
challengesinvolvedinbringingarareearthminetoproduction.Theseproblemsforasmoothexpansion
ofdysprosiumsupplyarefurtherexacerbatedbytherelativeunderͲrepresentationofdysprosiuminrare
earth ores as compared to the structure of demand.hDysprosium production is concentrated almost
entirelyinChina,acountrythatscoreshighonpoliticalriskindicators.iAsaresult,boththeconcentration















Dysprosium High High High High High
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gallium (about100 tonnesofprimaryoutput compared tomore than40million tonnesofaluminium
annually).bThereare few reliable sourcesofactualproduction statistics forgallium,howeverChina is
consideredakeyproduceralongsideJapanandGermany.cConcentrationofsupplyisthereforescoredas
medium.DuetothehighscoresforpoliticalriskindicatorsforthedominantproducerChina,politicalrisk





















Hafniumsupply isabyͲproductofzirconiumproduction,drivenbydemand in thenuclear industry for
highpurityzirconiummetalalloys,butgiven industryexpectationsofconsiderableoutputexpansion in
zirconiumproductionover thecomingdecade, limitations toexpandingsupply in theshort tomedium
term are scored as medium. Hafnium production is quite concentrated, with France and the US
dominatingtheproductionofhighpurityzirconiumfornuclearapplications,withhafniumasbyͲproduct.f
Theoverallscoreforsupplyconcentrationisthereforeassessedasmedium.Thepoliticalrisksassociated



































medium.Despiteavailable reserves,c limitations toexpandingoutput in theshort tomedium termare
assessedashigh. Indium isabyͲproductofzincrefiningandrecoveryratesarerelatively low,although
only certain zinc ores contain indium. Despite high prices, incentives for zinc refiners are limited to
recover indiumduring refiningdue to thevery small sizeof themarket (about600 tonnesofprimary
indiumproductionannuallycomparedtomorethatroughly11milliontonnesofzinc).d Indiumrefinery
production is relatively concentrated, with about half currently being located in China; significant
secondary production takes place in Japan.e The remainder of world supply, however, is not very
concentrated, sooverall supply concentration is scored asmedium. Political risks associatedwith the
mainproducerChinaarehigh,butaresomewhatmitigatedbylowscoresforothersignificantproducers.f
Overall political risk is therefore scored as medium. Table 18 shows the results of the bottleneck



















demandgrowth is therefore scoredasmedium.Substantial reservesareavailableandmolybdenum is
mined as both primary and byͲproduct.h Industry sources expect considerable new capacity to come
onlineoverthecomingdecade.iOverall, limitationstoexpandproduction intheshorttomediumterm
arescoredas low.The largesttwoproducingcountries,ChinaandtheUS,account foroverhalfglobal
supply, but the remainder of world production is relatively diversified.j Political risks are scored as
mediumgiventhevariedperformanceofkeyproducers inpoliticalrisk indicators.kTable19showsthe














Molybdenum Medium Low Medium Medium Low




















to medium term are scored as medium, due to the long lead times and complex commercial and
technicalchallengesinvolvedinbringingarareearthminetoproduction(comparedtodysprosium,risks
areassessedassomewhat lowerdueto the factthatcomparedtodemand,neodymiumusually is less





















Nickeldemand isexpected togrow substantiallyover thecomingdecade,mainlydrivenbyexpanding
stainlesssteeluse.cThe likelihoodof fastdemandgrowth isthereforescoredasmedium.Reservesare
estimatedtobelargerelativetocurrentlevelsofproductionandsignificantcapacitywillbeaddedover
the coming years.d Limitations to expanding supply are therefore scored as low. Production is
geographically quite dispersed.e Political risk of the largest producers (Russia, Indonesia and the
















Nickel Medium Low Low Medium Low
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score for shortͲ to mediumͲterm limitations to expand supply. Niobium production is highly
























tonnesof seleniumareproduced fromprimary sources comparing tomore than15million tonnesof
copper), copperproducershave limited commercial incentives to increaseproduction,even if there is
considerablescopetoimproveextractionrates.fOveralllimitationstoexpandingproductioncapacityare
scoredasmedium.Globalproductionisquiteconcentrated,galthoughmuchislocatedincountrieswith
















Selenium Medium Medium Medium Low Medium

 













Industryexpertsexpect fastdemandgrowth innewapplications forsilver,suchas inelectronics,tobe
balancedby traditional applications,wheredemand is largely stable.aThe likelihoodof rapiddemand
growthoverthecomingdecadeisthereforeassessedaslow.Reservelevelsforsilverarelargerelativeto
currentproduction,althoughmostof this isnot inprimary silverores.bAbouta thirdof silver supply
comes fromprimarysources,withtheremainderbeingabyͲproductofcopper, leadandzincrefining.c
Overalllimitationstoexpandingsupplyarescoredasmedium.Silverproductionisnotveryconcentrated




















Demand intellurium isexpectedto increaserapidlyoverthecomingdecade,especiallyduetosolarPV
applications.e Likelihoodof rapiddemandgrowthover the comingdecade is therefore scoredashigh.
Tellurium isquitea raremetalwithsignificantgeologicalconstraints. It isproducedasabyͲproductof
copperrefining.Giventhevery limitedsizeofthetelluriummarket(onlyabout500tonnesoftellurium
metalareminedperannumcomparedtomorethan15milliontonnesofcopper),fexpandingoutputhas
limitedcommercialappeal forcopper refiners.Overall limitations toexpanding telluriumsupply in the
shorttomediumtermarethereforescoredashigh.Detailedproductionstatisticsarenotavailable,but















Tellurium High High Low Medium High
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these countries score highly on political risk indicators.eOverall concentration of supply is scored as




















increasing shareofhighͲstrength steels, aswell asnew applications, for example, in redoxbatteries.f






































Table28 summarises the risks for supplyͲchainbottlenecks foreachof the14metals thatareused in
significantquantities in theSETͲPlan technologies.The resultshavebeen colourͲcoded toaidviewing.
Table28showsthatforfiveofthesefourteenmetals(cadmium,hafnium,molybdenum,nickelandsilver)
thelikelihoodofsupplyͲchainbottlenecksoccurringoverthenextdecadeisfoundtobelow.Thisisthe
case either because demand growth is expected to be relatively slow (e.g. in the case of cadmium,
hafnium or silver) or because there are few serious obstacles on expanding output through bringing
additionalcapacityintoproduction(e.g.inthecaseofnickelormolybdenum).Politicalrisksfailtochange
thisassessment,withonlymolybdenumbeingassociatedwithmoderatepolitical risks.For theothers,





expected to increase rapidly.However, onlymoderate growth is expected for tin and there are few
limitations to expand niobium and vanadium output. Therefore, the bottleneck screening finds only
limitedmarketrisksforthesethreemetals.Theyarenonethelessassignedamediumriskscorebecause
of the presence of significant political risks. In the case of niobium, it is the very high supplier
concentration (more than 90% of niobium production currently takes place in Brazil) that leads to
concerns.Forvanadiumand tin,moderatesupplierconcentrationsarecompoundedwithhighpolitical
riskscores forallmajorproducers (Chinaand Indonesia for tin,andChina,SouthAfricaandRussia for
vanadium).Inthecaseofselenium,therearenomajorpoliticalrisks,butduetostrongdemandandits
byͲproductcharacter,marketrisksareassessedtobemoderate,resultinginamediumoverallbottleneck
score. For these fourmetals, there isno immediate concernover supplyͲchainbottlenecks.However,
supplyanddemanddevelopmentscoulddeterioraterelativelyeasilyinthefutureandcouldescalaterisks

















Dysprosium High High High High
High
Neodymium High Medium High High
Tellurium High High Low Medium
Gallium High Medium Medium Medium
Indium Medium High Medium Medium
Niobium High Low High Medium
Medium
Vanadium High Low Medium High
Tin Low Medium Medium High
Selenium Medium Medium Medium Low
Silver Low Medium Low High
Low
Molybdenum Medium Low Medium Medium
Hafnium Low Medium Medium Low
Nickel Medium Low Low Medium























to the expansion of supply. Thesemetals aremainly recovered during zinc, copper and aluminium
refining,butthemarketsaretinyincomparisontothemarketsforthehostmetals.Primaryproduction
of roughly 600, 500 and 100metric tonnes of indium, tellurium and gallium respectively per annum
compareswithmorethan11,15and36millionmetrictonnesofprimaryproductionforzinc,copperand
aluminium.This isa factorof1:18,000,1:30,000,and1:360,000 in termsofquantitybetween thebyͲ
productandthehostmetal.EvenwithveryhighpricesforthebyͲproducts,thesmallsizeofthemarkets
createsonly very limited commercial incentives for zinc, copperandaluminium refiners topay strong




concentrationofsupply inChina.Politicalrisksare lessprominentfor indium,telluriumandgallium,as
supply is less concentrated and in each case there is significant production in countries which are
associatedwith lowpolitical risks. It is further interesting tonotethat for these fivemetals,geological
availability is not a central issue as they are all relatively abundant in the earth’s crust, except for
telluriumwhich is also quite scarce in the physical sense.Given these highmarket andpolitical risks
identified in this study, it isnot surprising thatmostof thesemetalshavebeen associatedwithhigh










Theanalysis in thisChaptershows thatahigh risk forsimilar futurebottleneckspersists for these five
metals.SuchsupplydisruptionsandpricerisescouldadverselyaffectthesmoothdeploymentofSETͲPlan
technologies and the realisation of the SETͲPlan targets. In Chapter 6, the reliance of SETͲPlan
technologies on these five bottleneckmetals is examined in greater detail. Chapter 7 then examines





Chapter4 identified futuremetalsdemand from six SETͲplan technologiesunderanoptimisticuptake
scenarioandusing“businessͲasͲusual”assumptionsaboutthemixofsubͲtechnologiesforsolarandwind




SETͲPlan technologies. This is important because these assumptions are subject to considerable
uncertaintyand—asthisChapterwilldemonstrate—inmanycaseshavea largepotential impact,both





Section 6.2 then explores how demand for these metals would be affected by variations of the







For theuptake scenarios, each ismodelledwith reference to a common2010baseline,which comes
fromEUenergytrendsto2030—Update2009,EC(2010).Moredetailsforeachscenariocanbefoundin
Appendix1.ItshouldbenotedthatthetechnologyuptakescenariosmodelledinChapter6,differfrom









5%CdTe,5%CIGS; and forwind15% low speedpermanentmagnet in2020and20% in2030.These















x For wind, the SETͲPlan metal requirements are greatest in the first decade, where






2010 2020 2030 2011Ͳ2020 2021Ͳ2030
Nuclear 127 123 124 1.4 2.1
Wind 86 222 280 13.6 5.8
SolarPV 38 49 72 1.1 2.3
CSP 0.7 1.2 3.6 0.1 0.2













2020 2030 2020 2030
Te 500 5 11 1.0% 2.1%
Dy 1,200 29 16 2.4% 1.4%
Nd 18,261 414 235 2.3% 1.3%
In 1,345 5 10 0.4% 0.8%




TheHighscenariorepresentsthe industryestimates foruptakeofSETͲPlantechnologies. Inmostcases
these forecasts are themost optimistic (seeAppendix 1 for a comparison). Strong implementation is
projected foreachof the technologies,particularly for solar;however for solaramore steady rateof
adoptionhasbeenmodelledcomparedtothatanalysedinChapter4forthesignificancescreening.Other




x ForsolartheSETͲPlanmetalrequirementsareslightlyhigher forthe firstdecaderather
thanthesecond,butareverylargeforbothdecadesconsideringthattheEuropeanSolar
industryrepresentsonlyoneofmanymarkets intheworldforthemetals.TheSETͲPlan








2010 2020 2030 2011Ͳ2020 2021Ͳ2030
Nuclear 127 198 297 8.9 11.9
Wind 86 230 400 14.4 17.0
SolarPV 38 360 630 32.2 27.0
CSP 0.7 30 60 2.9 3.0











2020 2030 2020 2030
Te 500 150 126 30.0% 25.2%
In 1,345 145 121 10.8% 9.0%
Dy 1,200 30 48 2.5% 4.0%
Nd 18,261 438 690 2.4% 3.8%








expected penetrations within the technology mix, so results of this modelling should be seen as







thin filmsolar technologies.These technologymixesareshown inTable33and inTable34,with their
respectivemarket shares and installed capacityper annum.This ismultipliedby the respectivemetal




















Marketshare(%) 80% 10% 5% 5% 100% 59% 15% 8% 18% 100%
InstalledCapacity(GW) 288 36 18 18 360 212 54 29 65 360
Averageperannum
(GW) 25.8 3.2 1.6 1.6 32.2 19.0 4.8 2.6 5.8 32.2
Te   150  150 30%   240  240 48%
In  17 26 102 145 11%  26 41 367 434 32%














Marketshare(%) 80% 10% 5% 5% 100% 59% 15% 8% 18% 100%
InstalledCapacity(GW) 504 63 32 32 630 372 95 50 113 630
Averageperannum
(GW) 21.6 2.7 1.4 1.4 27.0 15.9 4.1 2.2 4.9 27.0
Te   126  126 25%   202  202 40%
In  14 22 85 121 9%  22 34 308 364 27%




Forwind, there are awide rangeofpotential systems,which aremainlybasedon amixof geared /
gearless transmission;withelectromagnet (EM)/permanentmagnet (PM)generators.Technologically,
gearlesstransmission isthereforedirectͲdrive (DD)andalways linkedto lowͲspeedgenerators,butthe
lattermaybebasedonEMorPM.Whilst theanalysis thus farhasconcentratedon the installationof
electromagnet (EM) generators and gearless (DD) / permanentmagnet (PM) generator systems, it is
usefultohighlightthesensitivitiesassociatedwhenconsideringothercombinations.

The technologies considered within this analysis are gearedͲEM, direct driveͲEM, High Temperature
Superconductor(HTS,notyetcommercial),high/mediumͲspeedPMandDDͲPMsystems.Therareearth
magnet requirements of each of these are different,with some not using permanentmagnets at all,
othersusingrelativelysmallproportions,whiletheDDͲPMsystemsusethemost.Moreinformationcan







































147.2 34.5 2.3 23 23 230 92 46 11.5 34.5 46 230
Ave/yr
(GW) 9.2 2.2 0.1 1.4 1.4 14.4 5.8 2.9 0.7 2.2 2.9 14.4
Dy    2 20 22 1.9%    3 40 44 3.6%

































160 160 40 20 20 400 160 40 80 40 80 400
Ave/yr
(GW) 6.8 6.8 1.7 0.9 0.9 17 6.8 1.7 3.4 1.7 3.4 17
Dy    1 12 13 1.1%    3 48 50 4.2%






























2020 2030 2020 2030
Te 1.0% 2.1% 30.0% 25.2%
In 0.4% 0.8% 10.8% 9.0%
Dy 2.4% 1.4% 2.5% 4.0%
Nd 2.3% 1.3% 2.4% 3.8%








cͲSidominant Thinfilmuptake EMdominant PM&HTSUptake
2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Te 30% 25% 48% 40% Dy 1.9% 1.1% 3.6% 4.2%
In 11% 9% 32% 27% Nd 1.8% 1.1% 3.5% 4.0%
Ga 2.3% 2.0% 8.4% 7.0%
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Plan technologies inEurope. InChapter5, itwas found that for fiveof thesemetals,namely indium,
telluriumandgalliumandtherareearthelementsneodymiumanddysprosium,thereareconsiderable
risksforfuturebottlenecks.Thesearemainlyrelatedtomarketdynamicsand,inthecaseofrareearths,
exacerbatedbypoliticalrisks. InChapter6,the futuretechnologyuptakescenarios foralltechnologies
and, in particular, the technologymixes for solar and wind energy were examined, where the five
bottleneck metals are in most demand. It demonstrated how the variations create important






SETͲPlan.Tobe successful, suchmitigationmeasuresmustbebasedona soundunderstandingof the
complex supply chains of thesemetals. The next section therefore discusses these supply chains in
greaterdepth.MoredetailsoftheinformationcontainedinSection7.1canbefoundinAppendix3.aTo
follow,Europeanmitigationmeasuresateachstageofthesupplychainarediscussedindetail,including





Key toapplicationsof rareearths inSETPlan technologies,especially forwind, ispermanentmagnets.
ThesupplyͲchainmap,seeFigure3,iscommonforneodymiumanddysprosiuminpermanentmagnets,
sotheyarediscussedtogether.Atpresent,over95%oftheproductionofrareearthoxidestakesplacein
China. The stages in production are the mining and concentration of the rare earth ores and the
separation into the 17 different individual rare earth oxides by solvent extraction. This processing is
complexastheindividualrareearthelementsarechemicallysimilarandeachorebodyrequiresspecific
technologyuniqueforthatparticulardeposittobedeveloped inordertoextractandseparatetherare
earthelements.bCommon typesof rare earthores includebastnaesite,monazite, xenotime and ionic
clays,andcanbeextractedeitherasasingleproductorasabyͲproduct, forexample,with ironore in
InnerMongolia.Thecompositionoftheorebodiesvariesconsiderablybetweendifferentorebodies.For
example,MountainPass inCaliforniahasneodymiumcontentataround12%andvery lowdysprosium






The next stage is to refine and purify the rare earth oxides into their metals using ionͲexchange
purification to achieve the highest purities. For 2015, over 95% of dysprosium and over 90% of
neodymiumproduction isforecasttobeconsumedwithinpermanentmagnets.dFortheformingofthe
























ThesupplyͲchainmap for indiumPV thin films is shown inFigure4. Indium isnotminedasaprimary
product, but is produced as a byͲproduct from the refining of basemetals. Almost all commercially
produced indium isextractedfromzincrefining. Indiumalsooccurs indepositsofcopper, leadandtin,
butmostlyatsubͲeconomiclevels.

TheUSGSestimatesthatrefineryproduction forvirgin indiumwas574tonnes in2010,ofwhichChina
accountsforthelargestproportionwith300tonnes,whichisconsistentwithChina’sleadingpositionin












The zinc concentrates are then refined, atwhich point the indium is separated, but only if the zinc
refineryhas the requiredprocessesandequipment installed. It isestimated thatonly26%of the zinc
concentratesproducedoutsideofChinaandCISgoes to indium capable refineries.g It is important to
notethatfromazincproducerperspective,indiumandotherbyͲproductsareessentially‘impurities’that
needtobeseparatedfromtheproductduringtherefiningprocessandthathighconcentrationsofsuch
impuritiesare thereforenotnecessarilydesirable.However,whereequipment for indiumextraction is
installed the byͲproduct can produce valuable revenue and it is reported that some indium capable
refineriesareprepared topayadditional freight costs to source indiumͲcontaining zinc concentrates.h
The indium isproducedfromresiduescollectedfromzincrefiningandrecyclingoffluedustsandgases





















Recovery rates for the spent ITO are high at approximately 95%,cwhichmakes reclaimed indium as
importantorevenagreatersourceofindiumthanvirginproduction.Atpresent,relativelyfewflatpanel
displayshaveyet reached theirendͲofͲlifeandentering thewastestream.Flatpaneldisplaysand thin















In 2010, primary gallium productionwas estimated at 106 tonneswith China,Germany,Ukraine and
Kazakhstan being themajor producers. To a lesser extent Hungary, Japan, Russia and Slovakia also










After purification, gallium is synthesisedmainly with arsenide or nitrate to produce GaAs and GaN
compounds which in turn are used as base materials in advanced semiconductors. GalliumͲbased
semiconductors find use in a variety of technologies. GaAs is utilised in integrated circuits
(chips/microchips)forwirelessdevicessuchasradiocomponents,handsetsandcellphones.Inparticular,

















notebookdisplays,computer flatͲscreensand television flatͲscreens.Demand forLEDs is forecasted to





Tellurium isaminormetalthat is found incombinationwithseveralbasemetalssuchascopper, lead,
gold,nickel,platinum and zinc.However, almost all tellurium currentlyproduced isobtained as abyͲ
productofcopperrefining.Copperores,whichareestimatedtobearapproximately22,000toftellurium
reserves worldwide,b are fairly well distributed around the globe and, compared to other tellurium
capableores,containonaveragethehighestconcentrations(accordingtoestimatesfromtheUSGSca.
80ppm).cWhilethetheoreticalmaximumglobalproductioncapacityp.a. isestimatedat1,500tonnes,d
exact global production figures for tellurium are hard to ascertain, as not all countries disclose their
productiondata.However,industrysourcesestimateglobalproductionatabout500tonnesannually,ea
quarterofwhichisthoughttotakeplaceinEurope.fFiguresfortelluriumsecondaryproductionarealso
unknown, although small quantities of new scrap from CdTe production are known to be recycled.g





and from the flue dusts and gases generated during the smelting of copper.h Tellurium can only be
extractedfromcopperthatisrefinedbytheelectroͲwinningprocess,atechniquethatiscostͲeffectively







The next stage is the refining and purification of the extracted tellurium. The required purity degree
varies depending on the specific application. Currently, 42% of tellurium is used as an alloy agent in
stainlesssteelandcopper to improvemachinabilityand in lead to improve resistance tovibrationand
fatigue.kMore than 25% of tellurium is synthesised with cadmium in the cadmiumͲtelluride (CdTe)
compoundwhich isthenused inavarietyofsemiconductortechnologies,mainly inthesolarsector. In
2009 solar thin films represented the second largest consumer segment for telluriumwith a shareof
aroundaquarterofworldconsumption.l
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Oneof themostobviousoptions toprevent theoccurrenceof supplyͲchainbottlenecks fora specific
metal istoexpand itsoutput. Inprinciple,expandingglobalsupplieshelpstoalleviaterisks forsupplyͲ







juniormining companies toopen rare earthminesoutsideofChina,notably in theUS,Australia and












However,withnodirectaccess to rareearthelements, increasingexport restrictions fromChina,and
fierce international competition over new sources that are being developed outside of China,
downstreamprocessorsandmanufacturersofrareearthsfacelimitedincentivesforsignificantlongͲterm




minerMolycorp inApril2011,creatingprospects for furtherupͲscalingof itsactivities.dConfrontedby
similarproblems,theBritishalloyproducerLCMhassoughttoverticallyintegratewithaCanadianjunior
REEminingcompany.EuropeanminingofREE’scouldpotentiallyhelpprovidea longͲtermperspective
and supply security to EuropeandownstreamprocessorsofREEs and reduce risks for the rare earths
industry in Europe. This could help to stimulate European rare earths knowledge, expertise and
productioncapacity,whichcouldhelptoensureadequatemetalsupplytoSETͲPlantechnologies.

While the European geology is generally not very rich in rare earths, they are known to exist in
Scandinavia and Greenland and several deposits are currently being explored by junior mining
companies.TwoofthemostpromisingprojectsareperhapstheKvanefjelddepositinGreenlandandthe
NoraKärrprojectinSweden,whicharecurrentlybeingdevelopedbyGreenlandEnergyandMineralsand








benecessary tobring thesemines intoproductionandconcentrate theores.However,different from
rare earth projects currently being developed in Canada or Australia, such projects could potentially
benefit from themodification of existing European separation capacities instead of having to rely on




European separation facilities, and the complexity ofmodifying them to dealwith the specificities of
differentorebodiesislikelytobesignificantbutnonethelessbelowthoseofconstructinganewfacility.

Also, environmental management poses particular challenges in the rare earths mines due to the
presence of radionuclides in somemine tailings.c A recent report by the German ÖkoͲInstitute, for
example, raises such concerns with regards to the Kvanefjeld project.d Obtaining the necessary
environmentalpermitwouldposeasignificanthurdleforrealisingaEuropeanrareearthsminingproject.
Asamitigationmeasure,theEuropeanrareearthspotentialcertainlymeritsfurtherexploration,evenif



















around the world they must overcome significant challenges before they can go into production,
including demonstrating commercial viability and obtaining the relevant environmental permits.
European policymakers and member country authorities should explore possibilities to support
companies in fastͲtracking exploration activities and regulatory procedures. An alternativemitigation





very different type of challenge from increasing rare earths production. Possibilities to expand the
European output for these three metals are discussed together here, because the basic problems
involved are very similar. The key issue here is not to open newmines, but to increase byͲproduct












recovery from basemetal refining,most notably from zinc (for indium), copper (for tellurium) and
aluminium(forgallium)refining.Also,giventhatasizablerefiningindustryalreadyexistsinEuropeforall
threeofthesehostmetals,thechallengestoboostoutputarelesssignificantthanintherareearthscase.









but also on the ease of purification, longͲterm supply contracts and supply security
considerationsaswellastransportcosts.bMostbauxiteandcopperoresdocontaingallium
or tellurium, but also here concentrations vary and do not always warrant economic
extraction.c

2. The second issue concerns the technical capabilitiesof refiners toextract thebyͲproduct.











3. The third issue concerns financing, closely related to the previous issue. The differences
between the different byͲproducts are considerable here. Industry experts estimate the








4. Thefourth issuethatregardsthewillingnessofrefinerstoget involved intotheproduction
remainsan issue.ManyrefinersregardthesmallbyͲproductmarketsasadistraction from
their coreͲbusiness and are reluctant to invest time,money and effort to get involved in
volatile nicheͲmarkets that lack scale and transparency, even if price levels are currently




Taken together, these various obstacles lead to limited and in many cases suboptimal byͲproduct
extraction.Therearenopubliclyavailablesourcesdocumentingwhichoftheserefineriesarerecovering




















therelativelyhigh investmentsnecessarytosetup indiumextractionequipment.Fortellurium,there is







these sourcesand50Ͳ100tperannumof tellurium,with someadditional capacityavailable.a It should






telluride mine from 2012 onwards, with a target capacity of 20tpa, which would be a significant
contributiontoworldsupply.d
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hand, is a demand sidemeasure,where lessmaterial iswasted, and the same amount of output is
possiblewith lessmaterial, resulting in lesspressure fromdemandon limited supplies. The following





as the material is typically much easier to collect and process as it is much less dispersed and













lessthan1%ofREEsarerecycled fromoldscrap,mainly fromoldmagnets.aPreͲconsumerwaste isan
issue forNdFeBmagnets as they are brittle and fracture easily.An estimated 20Ͳ30% of themagnet
material isscrappedduringmanufacturingduetobreakagesorwastecuttings.bAtpresent it ischeaper
to buy newly manufactured magnets than to reprocess the scrap material, and typically the scrap
materialscanendupingenericscrapmetalwastestreams.

As forpostͲconsumer scrap,manyof theproductswithinwhich themagnetsare containedhave long
lifetimesandarenotexpectedtoreachtheirendͲofͲlifeinthenearfuture.Forexample,thelownumber






life.Recoveryof thesemagnets isnotpracticallyor economically feasibledue to their small size and
because theyareoftenglued toother componentsmaking separation impossible.Whenprocessedas
WEEE, themetal inmagnets enters light iron processing routeswhere it is diluted beyond recovery.




However,permanentmagnetscontainedwithinharddiscdrives representanotableexception to this.
Thepotentialriskofsensitivedata loss forcompanieshas ledtotargetedservices fordatadestruction
fromoldharddiscdrives.Severaldifferentpracticesareused,buttheconsumerͲdrivenseparationand
identificationof these components shouldhelp in collecting theneodymiummagnets.Most collection
and separation techniques forharddiscdrives result in thedrivebeing shredded; this serves thedual
purpose of enabling extraction of materials for sale and ensuring that sensitive data is destroyed,
suggesting that access to these magnets should be relatively easy. However, there is currently no
evidencethatthemagnetsarerecoveredforrecycling.There isevidencethoughthatnovelresearch is
onͲgoing, forexample,BirminghamUniversity is involved inaproject,easareHitachi in Japan.fSeveral
technologies for recyclingREEmagnetshavebeendescribed in the literature.gThesemay recycle the
materialitselfasanalloytoformnewmagnets,orreturnthematerialsbacktotheindividualmetalsfor
processing into new magnets.h These include hydrogenation disproportionation desorption
recombination (HDDR),i dissolution inmoltenmagnesiumj and acid leaching.k Thesematerials can be
usedinnewmagnets,butwithalossofperformance.































Gardanne 700 France RioTintoAlcan 
Aughinish 1,900 Ireland Rusal 
SanCiprian 1,600 Spain Alcoa 
Distomon 800 Greece Mytilineos 
Ajka 300 Hungary MALMagyarAluminum ca.4tGap.a.
Stade 900 Germany AOS(Ingal) ca.25Ͳ30tGap.a.
Tulcea 400 Romania Vimetco 








Kokkola 300 Finland Boliden 
Odda 100 Norway Boliden 
Bukowno 100 Poland BoleslawZGH 
PortoVesme 100 Italy Glencore 
Plovdiv 80 Bulgaria KCM 
Miasteczko 80 Poland  
CopsaMica 30 Romania Mytilineos 
Auby 300 France Nyrstar ca.30Ͳ40tInp.a.
Balen 300 Belgium Nyrstar 
Budel 300 Netherlands Nyrstar 
Kardjali 40 Bulgaria OCK 
Nordenham 200 Germany Xstrata 
SanJuandeNieva 600 Spain Xstrata 









Huelva 320 Spain AtlanticCopperS.A. ca.2tTep.a.
Olen 345 Belgium Aurubisa
Estimatedproduction
isca.20tTep.a.
Pirdop 180 Bulgaria Aurubis
Hamburg 395 Germany Aurubis
Lunen 220 Germany Aurubis
Harjavalta(Pori) 153 Finland Boliden Estimatedproduction
isca.15Ͳ20tTep.a.Ronnskar 250 Sweden Boliden
BaiaMare 40 Romania Cuprom 
LasCruces 72 Spain Inmet 
Glogow 480 Poland KGHM Estimatedproduction
isca.5tTep.a.Legnica 100 Poland KGHM
Osnabruck 160 Germany KME 
Barcelona 80 Spain LaFarga 
Bersee 35 Belgium LaMetalloChimique 
Brixlegg 110 Austria MontanwerkeBrixlegg 
Hoboken 28 Belgium Umicore ca.20tTep.a.
Nikkelverk 40 Norway Xstrataplc 
Total 3,008   ca.62Ͳ67tTep.a.
Sources:Calculationsbasedonexpertinterviewsandvariousindustryestimates





Costsof recycling rare earths aredifficult to estimate sinceno commercialprocess exists atpresent.
GreaterdisassemblyandpreͲprocessingofpostͲconsumerWEEEwouldberequiredataround100Ͳ1000
sitesacrossEurope thatcarryoutpreͲprocessingofWEEEwaste.Thiswould thenbe followedby the
metalrecyclingstep,whichmightbecarriedoutatafewdedicatedfacilitiesforrareearthsoraspartof
anintegratedsecondarysmelterrecoveringanumberofmetals.Inbothcases,therareearthsarelikely
to be recovered inmixed form,with further separation to the individual element required, although
some laboratory processes have achieved separate recovery of neodymium. Speculative capital costs
mightbe€0.1Ͳ1.0mforeachpreͲprocessorand€10mͲ€100mfortherecyclingstep.








indium. This is because the inefficiencies of the sputtering process of ITO onto glassmean that only
around30%ofthe ITO isactuallydeposited.Howevermuchofthespentmaterialcanbecollected for
recycling.IndiumCorporationreportthatrecoveryyieldshaveincreasedfrom55%toaround75Ͳ80%and
more recently to 95% of themateriala and turnͲaround times have been reduced to under 15 days.
Therefore this process appears to have been fully optimised, although it is noted that geographically
mostoftheactivityislocatedinAsia,notablyinJapan,Korea,TaiwanandalsoChina.b

Recovery of indium from postͲconsumer flat panel display (FPD) glass does not appear to have been
solved, with only an estimated 1% being recovered due to the dissipative use of indium in this
application, as only low concentrations of ITO are present in FPDs.c  Indeed a study byWRAP that
examinedtheeconomicsofrecyclingFPDconsideredthe ITOͲcontainingglassasawasteratherthana
resource for recycling.dHowever,given that74%of theworld’s indiumproduction isconsumedwithin
FPDs, thismakes these products an obvious target for indium recovery. Smelting is not seen as an
attractiveoptiontoobtaintheindiumfromtheseproducts.Therelativelysmallquantitiesofindiumare
dwarfedbytheamountoflowͲvalueglasssubstrate,makingtheeconomicsofrecoverylessfavourable.
In addition, smelting would be inefficient with most of the energy focused on melting the glass.e
NonethelessUmicore(Belgium)havecapacitytorecoverabout50tonnesperannumofindium.fCurrent
productionlevelsarereportedat30Ͳ40tonnesperannumofwhich20Ͳ25%comesfromrecycledsources
(mostly scrap from PV production – see below, but also indium containedwithinmobile phones and
solders/alloys).gThis facilityalso recovers the indium inconjunctionwithantimonyand tellurium from
WEEEwastestreamsandhasbeenverywelldescribed.hAlessconventionalroutehoweverappearstobe
needed to increase the recovery of the indium from postͲconsumer FPDs. Presently, there does not
appeartobeanycommerciallyavailablemeanstorecyclepostͲconsumerITOfromFPDs,whichshouldbe
seenasapotentialtargetforfurtherresearch.FPDsshouldbeeasilyseparablefromothertypesofWEEE
because theyareeasily recognisable.Thisshouldenablesufficientconcentrationofmaterial toenable
more effective recyclingmethods to be developed.One process identifiedwas by the Ashahi Pretec
Group in Kobe, Japan,which recovers indium from FPDs by dissolution techniques.i It is noted that
significantvolumeswilloccurinthewastestreambetween2012and2030.j
















recoversmetals fromhighͲgradePV residues.Theseare typicallyproduction scrap residues fromCIGS












andWEEE, and recovering 17metals are put by Umicore as in excess of €1bn. The exact amount





very lowconcentrationof impurities.Thereforesophisticatedprocessing routesare required toensure
that thispurity isproduced.Only15%ofaGaAs ingot isactuallyusedduringelectronicsmanufacture,
andtheremaining85%canberecycled.dFor2010,worldgalliumrecyclingcapacitywasestimatedat141
tonnes (versus the 184 tonnes for primary production capacity),with recycling plants for new scrap
located inCanada,Germany,Japan,theUKandUSA.eAttheheightofthegalliumpriceboom in2001,
GaAsͲsubstratemaker SumitomoElectricestimated that itwas internally recycling40%of thegallium
used for crystalgrowth.A further20%was retrieved fromGaAsdevicemakers in the formofbroken








boards (PCBs), the recyclingofwhich ismostly governedby theWEEEdirective (althoughmanynonͲ
WEEEdirectiveproducts such as in the automotive and aviation industrywill also containPCBs). The
recoveryofmetalsfromcircuitboardstendstotakeplaceatoneofthemainEuropeanintegratedmetal
smeltersoroutside theEU.Variousmaterialseparation technologiesareused toconcentratesaleable
quantities of material into the manufacturing supply chain. For example, Umicore (Belgium) has
developedaprocessingtechnologytoseparate17differentelementsfromcircuitboardscrap;electronic
waste,PGMs, indiumandantimonyare refined for reuse.iOtherelementscontainedwithin thecircuit
board, including gallium, are generally disposed of as slag. Additionally there does not appear to be
sufficientcapacitytoprocessthe increasingcollectionofWEEE,asonlyaround6%ofthefeedstockcan
















Research isongoing fornew technologies to extract further value from the scrap.bHowever, there is
doubt that the current smeltingmethods of recycling could effectively recycle gallium. The relative






The recyclingofpreͲconsumer solarCIGSproductionwaste is alreadyoccurring (see Section 7.1.2on
indium recycling).Collection routes forendͲofͲlife solarPVhavebeenestablished throughavoluntary
takeͲbackscheme,establishedby thePV industry in2007 (PVCYCLE).However, thevolumescollected













ferrousscrap,meaning thatalthough the telluriumwillbe ‘recycled’, itwillnotbeavailable to replace












solarcells.Estimateson thematerialutilisation rates range from35% to90%.Thematerial lossesare
collectedbyfiltersystemswiththerecyclingofthefilterresiduesbothfeasibleandeconomicfor largeͲ
scaleproduction.iTothatend,theworld’slargestproducerofCdTesolarPV,FirstSolar,hasimplemented
its own recycling scheme for both preͲconsumer scrap and of complete solar cells collected freeͲofͲ
charge from consumers.j The process is operated in the US and Germany and involves shredding,














removing the filmsusing acid and hydrogenperoxide and separating themetalͲrich liquid for further
processing.a Although it is a lengthy process, it is highly efficient and can recover 95% of the
semiconductormaterialsforuseinnewsolarmodules,aswellas90%oftheglass.bTherecyclingofCdTe





R&Dof the recycling technologies is required.As forpostͲconsumerwaste, thebestopportunities lie
withinrecyclingthemagnetscontainedwithinharddiscdriveswherethevolumesarising inthewaste
streamaresignificantandconsumerdrivenseparationisoccurringduetodatasecurityreasons.However
ingeneral,magnetsarenotexpected toenterwastestreams in largequantities forsome timeand to
effectively recover them,collectionand sortingsystemswouldneed tobedeveloped.Therearesome
technologiesbeingdeveloped toeffectively recover/reusemagnetsbut further research in thisarea is
stillneededforfullcommercialisation.

Indium recoveryofpreͲconsumerprocessingwaste appears tohavebeenoptimised, althoughmainly
located inAsia. PostͲconsumerwaste can alsobe recovered if they are concentratedhigh enough to
makeitviablefortheprocessorstoextract.Thiswouldrequiretheseparationofflatpaneldisplaysfrom
othertypesofWEEE,whichwouldgiveopportunitytorecoverthevery largeportionof indium’suse in


















applications that competewith SETͲPlan applications for the supplyofbottleneckmetals.This canbe
achievedbydevelopingalternativematerialsthatcanbeusedasasubstitutetothebottleneckmetalin
these technologies.Alternatively, it can also consistof replacing the specific technologywith another
technology that is its functionalequivalent,butbyvirtueof itsdesigndoesnot relyon thebottleneck




Discovered in the early 1980s as cheaper alternatives to samarium cobaltͲbased magnets, NdFeB









plethora of new technologies and novel uses. To date, NdFeBͲbasedmaterials remain the strongest
permanentmagnetsdiscovered,byalargemargin.

Internationally, a vast amount of research has been targeted at improving various aspects of the
performance of this material. Gradual advances in synthesis, manufacturing and magnetisation
techniques have led to a twoͲfold increase in their magnetic strength since the midͲ1980s, and
















Neodymium – Increasing the magnetic strength of neodymiumͲbased magnets would allow a
reductioninthesizeofthesemagnetsandthereforethequantityofneodymiumrequired.Asstated
above, significant advances weremade soon after the discovery of thismaterial, resulting in a
doublingofmagneticstrength.More recent improvementsaregenerally inproduction techniques,
suchastheshiftfrombondingtosinteringofmagnets,orenhancedmethodsformagnetisationusing
powerful superconductingmagnets. These developments have primarily arisen from research in
Japan,Chinaand theUSA.Some further improvementsmayalsoarise fromdevelopment inareas
suchasnanotechnologyandmaterialschemistry.However,themagneticstrengthofthemostrecent






continue. This has been identified by various organisations and a considerable research effort is
underwaytoreducethequantityofdysprosiumrequiredtoachievethenecessaryperformanceover
the motor’s operating temperature. As observed with neodymium minimisation strategies, new
production techniquesarebeingdeveloped thatprovide thesame levelof temperature resistance
but using much lower levels of dysprosium doping. These focus on utilising dysprosium more
effectively within the material’s chemical structure, but are some way from commercialͲscale
operation (for example, grain boundary diffusion alloying); therefore it is difficult to predict the
actualreductionthesewillgenerate. Japanesecompaniesandresearchbodiesappeartobeatthe
forefront of this research and have heavily invested in it, in support of their large magnet
manufacturingindustry.TheJapaneseGovernmenthasalsobeenquicktoidentifyissuessurrounding













would be motor design and cooling features which reduce the operational temperature range,




Currently, there isnoevidenceof any successfuldevelopments towardsnewmaterialswhich can
competeorbetterthestrengthofneodymiumͲbasedmagnets.Indeed,manyexpertsbelievethatno




Of knownmagneticmaterials, the closest to neodymiummagnets in terms of performance are
samariumcobaltmagnets.Thesemagnetshavesuperiorresistancetotemperatureandareused in
nicheareas suchashigh temperatureapplications.However, thesemagnetshavearoundhalf the
magnetic strengthofneodymiumͲbasedmagnetsandare therefore far less suitable foruse inEV








superconduction fora largenumberofapplications, thereare significantongoing researchefforts
targeting new superconducting materials, particularly superconductors that operate at higher








Technology choice can be another way of mitigating the possible bottleneck. Neodymium and
dysprosiumareprimarilyused inPMGturbines.Thesecanchange from lowspeedtomediumand
highvarieties.Therearehowever,gearͲbasedwind turbineswithandwithoutpermanentmagnet
useaswellasHTS,whichisstillindevelopmentstages.Eachofthesehasdifferentrequirementsfor

























Elsewhere, indium phosphide can be substituted by gallium arsenide in solar cells and in many
semiconductorapplications.Hafniumcan replace indium innuclearreactorcontrol rodalloys.gGallium




Substitutesareavailableorarebeingdeveloped forgallium inanumberofapplications.However the
completereplacementofGaAs inallsemiconductorapplications looksunlikelyatpresent.Forexample,
GaAsͲbased integrated circuits areused inmanydefenceͲrelatedapplicationsbecauseof theirunique
propertiesandtherearenoeffectivesubstitutesforGaAsintheseapplications.Replacementbydifferent
materials ispossible incertaincases,howeverthistypicallyreliesonotherscarcematerial,suchasthe
germaniumͲbased materials in certain mobile phone applications and indium compounds as an









Selenium can replace tellurium in freeͲmachining lowͲcarbon steels as can bismuth, calcium, lead,
phosphorus and sulphur.i Tellurium can be replaced by selenium and sulphur in rubber compound
applicationsandselenium,germaniumandorganiccompounds inelectronicapplications.Seleniumcan
also replace tellurium in chromiumͲtelluriummagnetic alloys.jHowever, the replacementof tellurium
with selenium has problems, as selenium is considerably more toxic than tellurium, so additional





















There have been intense efforts to reduce and substitute the use of neodymium and dysprosium in
permanent magnets, but no substantial success has been achieved in terms of providing similar
performance levelstoNdͲbasedpermanentmagnets.However,substitutionatthesystems level, i.e.to





decadesold and it seems that it ismore attractive to replace thesematerialswith a completelynew
materialratherthananexistingmetal.Anexceptiontothisisforindiuminindiumtinoxidewherethere
is considerable researchbeingundertaken touse zincoxidesand itsderivatives, carbonnanotubesor





environmental benefits of using them in lowͲcarbon energy generation technologies has been
considered.ThelifeͲcycleinventoryofanumberofmetals(around30)wasgatheredaspartoftheRaw
MaterialsInitiative.aHoweverbecauseofthedifferentapplicationsandfunctionsofthedifferentmetals,
itwas not possible to use these “cradleͲtoͲgate” data: their use as facilitators of green technologies
meant that theuseͲphaseof theproductwascritical toconsiderationand suchdatawasnot typically
available.Despitethe lackofdata,thestatusoftellurium,galliumand indiumascoͲproductsalongside
rawmaterialsofmuchgreatervolumemeansthattheenvironmentalimpactattributabletothemwillbe
low, although this is likely to vary depending upon the methodology used for attribution. The
environmental impact attributable to the production phase of rare earths will be higher. However,
researchdoneforrareearthsandelectricvehicles(ratherthanforwindturbinegenerators)showsthat
theenvironmentalbenefitsofusing the rareearths inmotors ismuchgreater than theenvironmental




This Chapter has examined the options tomitigate themetal supplyͲchain risks associatedwith the





reducing the risk for futuresupplyͲchainbottlenecks towards themiddleof thepresentdecadeat the
earliest.

For rare earths, quite a sophisticated technological and industrial basis exists, which potentially
representsthebuildingblocksforarareearthssupplychaininEurope;althoughitisnotedthattheseare
owned by different companies and would require collaboration. In particular, Europe still has wellͲ
developed separation capacities,which present perhaps themost challenging step in the rare earths
supply chain, although the complexities of reͲopening separation facilities and modifying to the







specificitiesofdifferentorebodiescouldbehigh.Akeyproblem for rareearthshowever issecuringa
reliablesupplyofvirginmaterial.There issomepotentialforactualmineproduction inEurope,butthe
deposits thathavebeen identified so farwillneed considerable furtherexploration to ascertain their
commercialviabilityandhurdlestosecureenvironmentalpermitswouldformasubstantialobstacle.







collection and sorting systems would need to be developed. Efforts to replace neodymium and
dysprosium in permanentmagnet applications have so far notmetmuch success and system level
substitution,i.e.replacingthetechnologiesthatuserareearthswithalternativetechnologiesnotreliant




limited, not unless refiners could be convinced to switch to alternative (mostly South American) ore
suppliers.Theores thatEuropean zinc refiners currentlyuse are generally low in indium content and
wherepossible, indiumrecovery isoftenalreadyoptimised.Thesameappliestorecyclingofprocessing




for indium tinoxides. Somepossible alternativeshavebeen identified,but additional research in this
regardisneeded.

For tellurium, there is still considerable room to expand the scope and increase extraction rates of
recovery from European copper refiners. This is particularly attractive for tellurium because only
relatively small investments would be needed. Further efforts are necessary to increase existing




currently, much gallium content in bauxite that is processed in Europe ends up in waste streams.
Recyclingofprocessingwaste isquiteoptimisedalready today.Formostgalliumapplications, there is
littlescopeforrecyclingduetoitsdissipativeuse.TherecoveryofgalliumfrompreͲconsumerelectronics




for the fivemetals identified in Chapter 5, although eachmetal has its own recommendations. It is
recommended that the European Commission and EU Member States should actively engage in
consideringabroadarrayofmitigationmeasures,even ifmanyofthesolutionswillonlycontributeto
mitigatingbottleneckrisk inthemedium to longterm.Amongtheoptionssuggested forconsideration
areto:

1. Collectmoredataandprovidebetter informationon thedemand,supplyandprice trends for
metals that are used in significant quantities in SETͲPlan technologies. Bottleneck risks are
reducedbyafasterflowof informationbetweendecisionͲmakersandmarketparticipantsboth
inmetalmarketsaswellasintheconsumingindustries.








5. Create incentives toencouragebyͲproduct recovery in zinc, copperandaluminium refining in
Europe.
6. Promotethefurtherdevelopmentofrecyclingtechnologiesandespecially increasedendͲofͲlife
collection and processing for a number of particular components and products, notably
permanentmagnetsinharddiscdrivesandflatpaneldisplays.



































carbon capture and storage (CCS) and electricity grids,whichwerediscussed inChapter3.Chapter4
identified 14 metals that these technologies are likely to rely on over the coming two decades in




metals.The results identify5of the14metals forwhich indicatorsshowahigh risk for futuresupplyͲ
chainbottlenecks,which are the rareearths,neodymium anddysprosium, aswell as thebyͲproducts
indium,telluriumandgallium.

In the six SETͲPlan technologies, these fivemetals aremainly used in variouswind and solar energy
generationtechnologies.Chapter6examinedtheimpactonthedemandforthefivebottleneckmetalsof
variations in the assumed future technologyuptake and in the technologymix in thewind and solar
sector.Itshowsthatdependingontheprecisetechnologymix,demandcouldvarysignificantly,indicating
a considerabledegreeofuncertainty.Chapter7 thenexplored from aEuropeanperspective, a setof




















InChapter4, thedemand for60differentmetals in themostoptimistic scenario is calculated for the
deploymentofeachtechnologyandfindsthatmetalrequirements inthisscenarioaremostdemanding
between 2020 and 2030. However, these absolute volumes are not a usefulmetric for comparison
becauseglobalproductionvolumesfordifferentmetalsdifferconsiderablyrangingfromtensofmillions
of tonnes for somemetals to less than a hundred tonnes per annum for others. Instead, Chapter 4







others forwhich itwill implyamajor challenge for suppliers.Forexample,more than50%of current
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needed in such small quantities compared to current world supply that their sourcing is extremely
unlikely to constitute a significant problem. It is therefore noted that the deployment of SETͲPlan
technologies can create somepressureon the supplyofmanyminormetals.However,as the current
output of many base metals is so large, the additional pressure from the deployment of SETͲPlan
technologiesissmall.

8.2 Different Metals face Different Risks for Future SupplyͲChain
Bottlenecks
Highdemand forametaldoesnotnecessarilyconstituteaproblemas it stimulates increasing supply.
Metalsupplyhasexpandedsignificantly inthepastandthereisnoreasontoassumeapriorithatrapid
demand will necessarily constitute a problem. Nonetheless, there is potential for supplyͲchain
bottlenecks to occur which could result in price rises and supply disruptions. This could slow the
deploymentoftheSETͲPlantechnologiesandendangertheachievementoftheEurope2020targets.In
Chapter 5, the risks for such future supplyͲchain bottlenecks to occur are evaluated for each of the
fourteenmetalsforwhichthedeploymentofSETͲPlantechnologiescreatessignificantdemand.

Measuring such future risks is a complex challenge and is not an exact science. The present study
















Moderate risks are found for four othermetals (niobium, selenium, tin and vanadium). Demand for
niobium, selenium and vanadium is expected to increase relatively rapidly. However, onlymoderate
growth isexpectedfortinandtherearefew limitationstoexpandniobiumandvanadiumoutput.They
arenonethelessassignedamediumriskscorebecauseofthepresenceofsignificantpoliticalrisks.Inthe
caseofniobium, it istheveryhighsupplierconcentrationthat leadstoconcerns;forvanadiumandtin,
therearehighpolitical riskscores forallmajorproducers. In thecaseofselenium, therearenomajor
political risks, but strong demand and its byͲproduct character result in amedium overall bottleneck
score. For these fourmetals, there isno immediate concernover supplyͲchainbottlenecks.However,
















underpressure. In each case, there are also significantobstacles to expandingoutput in the short to
medium term, resulting in high overallmarket risk. In the case of the rare earths neodymium and
dysprosium,thesedifficultiesarerelatedtothecommercialandtechnicalchallengesinbringingnewrare
earthsminestothemarket.For indium,telluriumandgallium, it isthebyͲproductcharacterthatposes
obstaclestotheexpansionofsupply.ThesehighͲmarketrisksarecompoundedintherareearthscaseby
high political risks due to the concentration of supply in China. Political risks are less prominent for




Takenaltogether,Chapters4and5demonstrate,using themostoptimisticprojections for technology
uptake,verydifferentvulnerabilitiesfordifferenttechnologies,whicharesummarisedbelow:

x PV uses three bottleneckmetals: tellurium, indium and gallium, of which the annual
demandbetween2020and2030oftellurium(50.4%)andindium(19.4%)representvery




world supply, as well as smaller quantities of two significant metals, nickel and
molybdenum.
x Nuclear uses only one bottleneck metal which is indium, albeit in a relatively small
proportionofworld supply (1.4%).Hafnium is themost importantamong thegroupof
significantmetalsrequiredatanestimated7%,withminorusesofsevenothersignificant
metals.







uncertaintieswith regards firstly to the uptake of SETͲPlan and secondly to variations in themix of
individualtechnologiesthatwillbeusedinPVandwindenergysectors.

The results show thatparticularly in thePV sector, futuredemandwillbehighly sensitive todifferent






dysprosium not exceeding 4% of currentworld supply at any point in time, although the timing of
demanddidvary.





technologies forPVcouldconsiderably increasetheSETͲPlandemandfortellurium, indiumandgallium
by asmuch as 60, 200 and 250% respectively. Forwind, the dominant technology of gearedͲturbine
systemsoftendoesnotusepermanentmagnetsatallandthereforedonotrequireanyneodymiumand
dysprosium.However,manysystemsdoemploypermanentmagnets,withtheusagebeingparticularly
high in the lowͲspeed systems. The effect of a shift away from electromagnetic systems towards





awhole. Ifbottlenecks forparticular technologiesdomaterialise, then alternative technologies are in
principleabletosubstitutepotentialbottlenecktechnologiesandhelptononethelessachieve theSETͲ
Plan targets. For companieswho are committed to particular technologies, the implications ofmetal
bottlenecks are likely to bemuchmore serious. Consequently, it is recommended that in order to
increase resilience, the SETͲPlan avoids such technology “lockͲin”, and does not attempt to “pick
winners” by favouring particular technologies, for example, through highlyͲtargeted research or






Chapter 7 explored a number of options that could form elements of a riskmitigation strategy that








The results show that there is some scope for effectivemitigationmeasures, althoughmanyof them





couldformthebuildingblocksforafuturerareearthssupplychain inEurope,although it isnotedthat
theseareownedbydifferentcompaniesandwouldrequirecollaboration.Akeyproblemforrareearth
companies inEurope issecuringa reliablesupplyofvirginmaterial.There issomepotential foractual
mine production in Europe, but the deposits that have been identified so far,will need considerable
furtherexplorationtoascertaintheircommercialviability.Furthermore,hurdlestosecureenvironmental




Therefore the utilisation and expansion of preͲexisting assets is a preferred strategy to a green field
facility.

There is also somepotential to recycle rare earths,both forpreͲconsumer andpostͲconsumer scrap.
However,furtherresearchisneededtodevelopandcommercialiserecyclingtechnologies.Akeyproblem
forpostͲconsumerapplications is that largequantitiesofpermanentmagnetswillnotenter thewaste
stream formany years.Amore immediateopportunity existswithin recycling themagnets contained




i.e. replacing the technologies that use rare earthswith alternative technologies that do not rely on





The ores that European zinc refiners currently use are generally low in indium content and where
possible,indiumrecoveryisoftenalreadyoptimised.Thesameappliestorecyclingofprocessingwaste.
There is however some potential to recycle indium from postͲconsumerwaste in flat panel displays,
althoughfurtherresearchoftherecyclingtechnologies,aswellasthedevelopmentof infrastructureto




For tellurium, there is still considerable room to expand the scope and increase extraction rates of
recovery from European copper refiners. This is particularly attractive for tellurium because only
relatively small investmentswouldbeneededcompared to those required toextract specialitymetals





currentlymuchofthegalliumcontent inbauxitethat isprocessed inEuropeendsup inwastestreams.
Recyclingofprocessingwaste isquiteoptimisedalready today.Formostgalliumapplications, there is
littlescopeforrecyclingduetoitsdissipativeuse.TherecoveryofgalliumfrompreͲconsumerelectronics









1. Collectmoredataandprovidebetter informationonthedemand,supplyandprice trends
formetals thatareused in significantquantities inSETͲPlan technologies.Bottleneck risks
are reduced by a faster flow of information between decisionͲmakers and market
participants both inmetalmarkets, aswell as in the consuming industries. This can be
achievedby:






iii. ensuring that any informational actions for the “critical” materials gallium,
indiumandtherareearthsarealsoduplicatedfortellurium,whichfallsoutside
thisgroup.
2. Support and sustain the existing rare earths supply chain in Europe, including efforts to
ensurereliablesupplyoforeconcentratesatcompetitivepricesthrough:
i. feasibilitystudiesonbringingbackintouseandupdatingexistingassets
ii. R&D and demonstration projects on new lower cost separation processes,
particularlythosefrombyͲproductortailingscontainingrareearths
iii. collaboration with other countries/regions with a shared agenda of risk
reduction such as the USA and Japan in exchange of information on
underpinningscienceorinpreͲcompetitiveresearch.
3. Support juniorminers,possiblyviaEBRDcoͲfundingof feasibilitystudies, inexplorationof
promisingEuropeanrareearthdeposits,aswellastherespectivepermitprocesses.
4. Raiseawarenessandengageinanactivedialoguewithzinc,copperandaluminiumrefiners
overbyͲproductrecovery.Fortelluriumandgallium inparticularthere isscopeto increase
European recovery rates. This can be achieved, for example, by fundingworkshops and
networks via the appropriatemetal industry study group or development association to
identifyrisks,barriersandbenefitstofurtherinvestment.







processes to recover the rare earths and indium and for innovative design that enables
easierandquickerdisassemblywhilstretainingproductintegrityandfunctionality.
7. Measures for the implementation of the revised WEEE Directive should include
encouragementfortherecoveryofsuchlesscommonmetalsalongsidethemainmetalsthat
areusuallytargetedformassͲbasedrecoverysystems.
8. Invest broadly in alternative technologies that can provide systemͲlevel substitutes to







Plan technologies. Important demandͲside technologies such as electric vehicles, lowͲcarbon lighting,
electricitystorageorfuelcellandhydrogentechnologies,whicharekeytoEurope’s lowͲcarbonenergy






































































The following tableand figurepresent informationon the forecastenergymixof theEUͲ27 till2030.









EnergySource 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Nuclearenergy 127 127 123 115 124
Hydro(excl.pumping) 107 111 114 115 118
Wind 86 144 222 248 280
Solar 15 28 49 60 72
Otherrenewables 0 1 4 5 7
Solidsfired:conventional 183 182 161 148 142
Solidsfired:CCS 0 0 5 6 6
Gasfired 216 243 238 254 268
Oilfired 56 44 37 34 31
BiomassͲwastefired 24 40 55 60 66
Geothermalheat 1 1 1 2 3
Total 815 921 1,009 1,047 1,117









The following tablesprovidedetailsofscenarios for theuptakeofSETͲPlan technologies inEurope for
2020and2030.Thetwoprincipalsourcesusedwere:
x Commission (2007), A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SETͲPlan): TechnologyMap,
CommissionStaffWorkingDocument,SEC(2007)1510
x JRCͲSETIS (2009),2009TechnologyMapof theEuropeanStrategicEnergyTechnologyPlan (SETͲ
Plan):Part–I:TechnologyDescriptions,JRCͲSETISWorkGroup.

From these scenarios, thehighestestimatewas selected asproviding theupperͲbound scenario.This
upperͲboundscenariowasusedinChapter3toidentifythegroupofmetalsthatarethemostsignificant









Source Scenario 2020 2030
Commission(2007) Baseline 120 148
Commission(2007) Potentialpenetration 180 300
JRCͲSETIS(2009) Industrytarget 230 350
*EWEA(2010) Short&mediumterm 230 400

A.1.1.2 Solar








Source Scenario 2020 2030
Commission(2007) Baselineb 9 16
Commission(2007) Maximumpotentialpenetration 125 665
JRCͲSETIS(2009) EPIA:Visionfor2020 390 Ͳ
*JRCͲIE(2010) Highscenario 360 630







Source Scenario 2020 2030
Commission(2007) Baseline 0 0
Commission(2007) Maximumpotentialpenetration 1.8 4.6
*JRCͲSETIS(2009) EuropeanSolarIndustryInitiative 30 60

A.1.1.3 Nuclear








Source Scenario 2020 2030
Commission(2007) Baseline 114 100
Commission(2007) Maximumpotentialpenetration 150 200
WorldNuclearAssociation Low 156 171




thebasis that theMaximumpotentialpenetrationestimated in2009superseded that from2007, this




Source Scenario 2020 2030
Commission(2007) Baseline 0 0
Commission(2007) Maximumpotentialpenetration 30 190
*JRCͲSETIS(2009) Maximumpotentialpenetration 0 80

A.1.1.5 ElectricityGrids






Source Scenario 2020 2030
*ENTSOͲE(2010) ProjectsofEuropeansignificance 42,100 Ͳ






shareofEU road transportpetrol anddiesel consumption,which came from SETͲPlandocumentation
(TableA8).

Theseestimatescanbecalculated inabsolute terms inMtoeusing the forecastRoadTransportPetrol






Source Scenario 2020 2030
Commission(2007) Baseline 7.5% 9.5%
Commission(2007) Lowerrangepotentialpenetration 10% 15%
*Commission(2007) Maximumpotentialpenetration 14% 20%

TableA9:BiofuelsConsumptioninRoadTransport(Mtoe)
Source Scenario 2020 2030
Commission(2007) Baseline 26.2 34.5
Commission(2007) Lowerrangepotentialpenetration 35.0 54.5





scenarios of the SETͲPlan. The details of the generation capacity mix behind these estimates are





A1 and Figure A1. The High uptake scenario is the combination of all of the upperͲbound scenarios
selectedintheprevioussection,andusedforthepurposeofthesignificancescreening.

It is interesting to compare the capacities indicated by the High scenario against those in the Low
scenario (TableA10 and FigureA2). The striking feature that emerges is the difference between the
relativeoptimismoftheenergysources.TheratiobetweentheHighscenarioandLowscenariois8times











Nuclear 123 198 1.61
Wind 222 230 1.04
Solar 49 360 7.35
CCS 5 7 1.4
Total 399 795 1.99
2030
Nuclear 124 297 2.40
Wind 280 400 1.43
Solar 72 630 8.75
CCS 6 80 13.33





Another result from this comparison is that in 2030, the total capacity from only the SETͲPlan
























1. Reactors to be built in Europewere assumed to be eitherWestinghouse AP1000 or Areva EPR
designs. Therefore wherever possible, material inventories were obtained from documents
concerningthesedesigns:www.areva.com,www.ukap1000application.com

2. Informationon fuelrequirementswereobtained fromtheWorldNuclearAssociation:www.worldͲ
nuclear.org















designs were used, notably on a 1,175MWe Trojan Nuclear Plant in Rainier, Oregon that has
operated since1975:Scrapmetal inventoriesatUSnuclearpowerplantsAppendixA inTechnical



























































Trojan 70 0.0596 70tinventorybasedonfiguresfrom
USEPA
Gd Burnableabsorber AP1000 0 GdreplacedbyboroninAP1000Ͳ
mainuseisinnuclearsubmarines




AP1000 1.56 0.0016 AssumedthatAgalloysareusedin
PWRcontrolrodsinpreferencetoHf,
whichisapossiblesubstitute





Trojan 83.2 0.0708 Upto4%Mobasedon2,080s/steel
Ni Superalloysinturbines
andstainlesssteels














































































diselenide (CIGS).The followingcurrentmarketshare istaken intoaccount:80%polycrystallinesilicon,
10%amorphoussilicon,5%CdTeand5%CIGS.

Metal requirements for a polycrystalline PV are shown in Table A12. Metal requirements change









film layer is around 2.5Ͳ3 μm thick, with Te requirements of 93.3 kg/MW. Consultation with CdTe
manufacturershasrevealedthatfortheTCOlayer,differentmaterialsareused.Forsomeofthesmaller
manufacturers,tinͲdopedindiumoxideistheTCOofchoicewithrequirementsof15.9and21.4kg/MW
of indiumand tin respectively.ThemainalternativeTCO is tinoxide,whichappears tobeusedby the
largestCdTemanufacturerFirstSolar.

ForCIGSͲbased thin films, calculationswerebasedon120W/m2panel.The thin layerand conductive










Component Quantity(2003)c% Quantity(2007)d% kg/kWp
Glass 62.7 74.16 77.3
Frames(e.g.AlMgSi0,5) 22 10.3 10.7
EVA 7.5 6.55 6.8
Solarcells 4 3.48 3.6
Backingfilm(Tedlar) 2.5 3.6 3.8
Junctionbox 1.2 n/a n/a
Adhesive,pottingcompound n/a 1.16 1.2
Weight,kg/kWp 103.6  103.4
Metals   kg/MWp
Al   10593
Mg   53.5
Si   3653
Cu 0.37 0.57 2741
Ag 0.14 0.005 24
Sn 0.12 0.12 577

















The components of wind energy, for at least the established technology of geared turbines with















the highͲgrade applications (gears, bearings, shafts, locating pins, spindles and hydraulicmanifolds)
would be 18NiCrMo7.a For the stainless steel, Type 316was selected as a typical grade. It has good








Type Grade Cr Ni Mo Mn Source
HighGradeSteel 18NiCrMo7 1.65% 1.55% 0.30% 0.70% CorusSpecialitySteels







TableA15 showsa rangeofestimatesof lowͲspeedPMGs,although these require significantlyhigher
magneticcontentthanmediumͲandhighͲspeedPMGs.TableA16showsthechemicalcompositionofthe









Source Min Max Mid
GeneralElectricb 0.5 0.75 0.625
TechnologyMetalsResearchc 0.67 0.67 0.67
AvalonRareMetalsb 0.6 1 0.8
JackLiftonReportd 0.7 1 0.85

TableA16:ChemicalCompositionofPermanentMagnets
Source Fe Nd Dy B
ShinEtsue 66% 29% 3% 1%
GreatWesternMineralsGroupf 68% 31% 1%
TechnologyMetalsResearchc 69% 28% 2% 1%
AvalonRareMetalsb  30%  

An important aspect in the modelling, however, is the technology split that is assumed between
permanentmagnetsandelectromagnetgeneratorsandbetweengearedandgearless transmission. In
OakdeneHollins’previousstudyonrareearthelements,gasurveyofwindturbinecompanies,produced







As mentioned above, different speeds of the permanent magnet generator means that they have
differentspecificmassofpermanentmagnets,e.g.80kg/MWformedium/highspeedversus700kg/MW






For bioenergy generation, the FischerͲTropsch (FͲT) type catalyst is taken into account, as syngas
produced frombiomass feedwillbecatalysed toproducedbioͲdieselorbioͲgasoline.For thisprocess,
thewellͲknown FͲT catalyst is cobalt basedwith a ruthenium promoter, i.e. 98% Co and 2% Ru. The
loadingonthealuminasubstratewas20%bymass.Fixedbedandslurrybedreactorsproducedifferent
levelsofproduct.Anaverageuseof0.15 tonne/m3catalystperhour isquoted in the literature. If the
lifetimeofacatalyst isaround10yearsthen1m3ofcatalystproducesabout13,143toeproducts in its
lifetime.In1m3catalyst,thereis776kgcobaltand16kgruthenium(20%metalloadingonly).Hencefor
everyktoeproduced,6kgofcobaltand0.12kg rutheniumare required (or5.61 tonnesofcobaltand
0.12tonnesofrutheniumperMtoeofproduct).





















  2010 2015 2020 2030
TotalMW  0 600 20,000 83,600
Demonstration
MW 0 300 3,600 3,600
No.ofplants(basedon300MW) 0 2 12 12
Commercial
MW 0 0 16,400 80,000
No.ofplants(basedon900MW) 0 0 18 89


Little isknownaboutthematerialsrequiredtoconstructacaptureplant,asthetechnology isnot fully
matured,andisatatooearlystagetodeterminewhichofthethreealternativeswillbethemostviable.















2020 20,000 50 210,000 420,000 630,000





























2020 12 3,600 18 9,000 12,600 4,939,200






SteelGradeComposition C Mn P S Si Cr Ni Cu V Nb Mo Co
APIX65 0.07 1.5 0.009 0.004 0.093 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.003 0.003







C Mn P S Si Cr Ni Cu V Nb Mo Co
2020 557,000 390 8,360 50 22 553 725 2,570 1,550 223 223 17 17








x Distributed PowerGeneration in Europe: technical issues for further integrationAngelo







grid operators (National Grid,Mr IanWelch) and academic researchers (Dr Keith Bell, University of
Strathclyde).

This researchconfirmed that thematerials requirementsof thosecomponents requiredspecifically for
making thegrid“smarter”wereminimalandcouldbe ignoredwithin thisstudy.These included largeͲ
scalesemiconductorsforpowerelectronics,semiconductingmaterialsforadditionalICTequipmentand
silica in fibreͲopticcables.Theadditionaldemand formaterialsoverandaboveworldwidedemand for
siliconͲbasedsemiconductorsandfibreͲopticcableisbelievedtobeinsignificant.
Conventionalgridinvestmentsto2020
This included conventional cabling and transformer investments requiredbynational grid companies,
including connection to renewable energy generation sources (e.g. offshore wind) and also grid









AC 32,500 25,700 6,900
ofwhich>300kV 29,600 23,200 6,400
DC(mainlysubsea) 9,600 9,600 0
















mm2 707 918 1140
Densityg/cm3 8.9 8.9 8.9









      =19,000tonnes(approx)acrossEuropeto2020.
Overheadcabling
Overheadcablingwasassumed tobealuminiumconductor,steelsupported (ACSS)orsteel reinforced
(ACSR).SomepenetrationofcarbonͲfibrecompositesupportedcable ispredictedbefore2020,butthis





Aluminiumc/smm2 1,000 1,120 1,250
Densityg/cm3 2.7 2.7 2.7
mass/km(t) 2.7 3.0 3.4
Source:ECN/GeneralCables
Hencetotalmassofaluminiumusedincabling =3.0x32500













The majority of the world’s primary cadmium production takes place in Asia; China produces
5,600tonnes followed by the Republic of Korea, Japan and Kazakhstan. In total, 22,000 tonnes of
cadmiumwasproduced in2010 (TableA25).Global secondaryproductionof cadmium accounted for
approximately20%ofallcadmiummetalproductionwithmostsecondarymetalbeingproduced from
nickelͲcadmium (NiCd)battery recycling.aChinaand Indiaholdarounda thirdofallcadmium reserves
worldwide,withtotalreservesaccountingfor660,000tonnes.
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JapanandKazakhstan (TableA26andTableA27).Politicalrisk forEuropeancadmiumsupply fromthe
world’s largest and fourth largest producers, China and Kazakhstan respectively, are relatively high.
Together,the4dominantsuppliersmakeup56%ofworldcadmiumproductionofworldsupply.These
risksarehoweverbalancedbytherelativelydiversifiedstructureofglobaloutputandanumberofstable































































































































China 57 84.6 9.0 6.8 7.9 6.1 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.2 3.3
SouthKorea 153 41.6 4.0 3.5 4.1 5.0 2.4 2.1 4.1 2.2 2.7 1.4 3.6 6.5
Japan 164 31.2 4.2 1.1 3.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.0 1.2 3.4 2.0 2.0 3.9
Kazakhstan 105 72.5 6.0 3.9 5.5 4.0 6.4 6.4 7.7 5.3 6.8 6.5 7.6 6.4
Source:FundforPeace
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China 36.8 5.2 29.7 58.1 46.2 45.3 36.2
SouthKorea 72.2 68.2 52.4 83.3 75.2 82.5 71.4
Japan 84.6 81.0 83.5 86.7 81.0 88.2 87.1
Kazakhstan 38.2 19.0 69.8 48.1 38.6 34.9 19.0
Source:WorldBank





Cadmium isaminorcomponent inmostzincoresandtherefore ismostoften isolatedasabyͲproduct








To a lesser degree, cadmium is also recovered from lead and copper. Secondary cadmium ismainly






rangeof colours from yellow andorange to red inplastics, glass and ceramics and as a stabiliser for
plasticsimprovingcorrosionresistance.Overthelastyearsmoreandmorecadmiumhasbeenusedfor








Reliable quantitative forecasts for the development of the cadmium market do not exist due to
unreliable production/consumption figures.d However, some important general observations can be
made.Overthelastdecadeglobalcadmiumconsumptionexperiencedaslowbutsteadydecline.eBothin
the US and in the European Union, concerns over cadmium toxicity ushered in several rounds of
increasingly restrictive regulationsoncadmiumuse.ThemarketshareofNiCdbatterieshasalsobeen











NiCd batteries (15/20%) is likely to survivemainly in industrial applications due to their sturdiness,
reliabilityandcostͲeffectiveness.Overall,industryexpertsexpectthedeclineindemandforcadmiumto































been used as the main production estimate in the report. An alternative and higher estimate put
dysprosium oxide newmine production at 2,000 tonnes for 2009.d Given the disproportionally high
concentrationofheavyrareearthelementsinthelateriticoresofSouthernChina,thecountry’sshareof
worlddysprosiumproductionmustbeestimatedasevenhigher than itsaggregateshare in rareearth
oreproduction.e

There is currently no dysprosium production in Europe and quantitative estimates for European
dysprosium reservesarenotavailable.However, it is reported that rareearthelements resources, i.e.




Chinadominates the currentworld supplyofdysprosium,witha shareof ca.97% in2009.Chinahas
imposedexportquotasonrareearthoxides(howevernotontheproductsmadeoutofthem)andhave
beentighteningthemprogressivelysince2004.iFurtherrestrictionshavebeenannouncedforthefuture.




Themainuse fordysprosium is inneodymiumͲironͲboronmagnets for applications such asharddisc
drives,automobilesandmotors,asinwindenergygeneration(FigureA7).Typicaldysprosiumcontentof
permanentmagnets is3%of theirweight.Highperformancemagnets forelectricandhybridvehicles
make themagnets in electricmotors lighterby90%j and “give resistance todemagnetisation athigh













temperatures as the magnet reaches temperatures of 160ºC”:a the dysprosium content for these
applications isupto10%.bGrowthrates inthedemandforrareearthelements inpermanentmagnets
hasbeenverystrong, increasingfrom5,500tonnesrareearthoxide in2003to10,400tonnes in2008c
(annualgrowthof13.6%); in2015 IMCOAforecastthatover95%ofdysprosiumconsumptionfor2015






















































































































































































































China 36.8 5.2 29.7 58.1 46.2 45.3 36.2
Source:WorldBank













Dysprosium supply and demand are forecast to more than double over ten years (Figure A8). A
significant supply shortage for dysprosium (23% of supply in 2020) is expected to open up over the








x Longer term supply assumes growth slowing to 3% per year for Chinese supply, but
remainingat20%peryearforsupplyintherestoftheworldc
x Longer term demand assumes a 9% per year global growth rate, asmodelled byÖkoͲ
Institut.d

Prices fordysprosiumoxidehave increased substantiallyover thepastyearsand continue toescalate
sharply(trebling inprice in2010andrisingby400% in2011alone,from100$/kgto1500$/kg)onthe
backof strongdemand, aggressive tighteningof export restrictions inChina andongoinguncertainty
about the furtherdevelopmentofChinesepolicy (FiguresA9aandA9b). It shouldbenoted that rare
































The soft silverymetal gallium (Ga) has the longest liquid range of all elementswith amelting point
slightlyaboveroomtemperature(29.76ȗC)andaboilingpointof2,204ȗC.aGallium ischemicallysimilar
toaluminiumandnearlyasdenseas iron. Ithasa lowvapourpressureathigh temperaturesandcan






































producers such as Japan and the US are considered as reliable suppliers. Furthermore, Europe and





























andgermanite,economicdepositsofgallium rarelyoccur; thereforeproduction isalmostentirelyasa
byͲproductofaluminaproduction.Theconcentrationofgallium inbauxiterangesbetween0.003%and






gallium arsenide (GaAs) and to a smaller extent as gallium nitride (GaN).GaAs is used in integrated
(chips/microchips)circuits,laserdiodes,photodetectorsandsolarcells,whereasGaNproducesblueand













x Thepartspermillionof gallium extracted frombauxite remaining constant at0.5ppm




Prices for gallium peaked at over US$2,000/kg in 2001 and have subsequently remained below
US$1,000/kg inthe interveningperiod(FigureA12).Givensharply increasingdemand,upwardpressure







































acids and its highmelting point of 2,200 °C.a However they have very different neutron absorbing
properties; hafnium absorbs neutrons making it suitable for control rods, whereas zirconium is






said to exceed 1 million tonnes.b Annual production figures of hafnium are not recorded but are
estimated tobe less than100 tonnescwithapproximately45 tonnesbeingproduced inFrenchpower
plants and another 45 tonnes coming from the United States.d An alternative estimate for hafnium
supplycanbecalculated,bottomͲup:3Ͳ4,000tonnesofzirconiumwereestimatedtobeusedinnuclear
applicationsin2007,eofwhichtheratioofzirconiumtohafniumis50:1.fThisputshafniumproductionat






































Commercialproductionofhafniumarose from theneed toproducehafniumͲfree zirconiummetal for





Today,mostof thehafnium is separated from zirconium through ionͲexchangeand solventͲextraction
techniques.Separatedashafniumdioxideandzirconiumdioxide,thehafniumcompound ischlorinated
to form hafnium tetrachloride, which is then sublimated before reduction with magnesium and
distillation to produce a solid intermediate product. Once broken and crushed, the product is then





Today, theprincipalusesofhafniumare in theaerospace industryasanalloyadditive innickelͲbased
superalloysand in theharshenvironmentsofpressurisedwater reactors fornuclearcontrol rodsand
submarines,whereitspropertiesoftemperatureandcorrosionresistanceandabilitytoabsorbmultiple
neutrons areput to gooduse (FigureA13).However,hafnium canbe substitutedby silverͲcadmiumͲ
indium control rods and is usually in the newer reactors.cHafnium is also used in highͲtemperature
ceramics,nozzles forplasmaͲarcmetal cutting and in gasͲfilled and incandescent lamps. Someof the



































Currentprice levelsforhafnium,3%Zr impurityareat$450/kg,whichrepresentsasignificant increase























Indium (In) isavery softmetalwitha shiny silver colourand ismainlyused in theproductionof flat






As indium isextractedasabyͲproductof zinc refining,upͲtoͲdate figures for indium reservesarenot
readilyavailable.However, in2007theUSGeologicalSurveypublishedtheir latestestimatesonworld
indiumreserves.AccordingtoUSGS,8,000tonnesofeconomicindiumdepositsarelocatedinChina,with
a world total of 11,000 tonnes. Additionally an estimated 16,000 tonnes of indium resources are
identified in theUSGSdataworldwide.Newerestimatesof resourcesare significantlyhigher,e.g. the
Indium Corporation estimates 50,000 tonnes of indium resources worldwide, including a significant
depositinNevesCorvo,Portugal(ca.4,700tonnes)andsmallerdepositsinGermany.b,c

Themajorityof indiumproductionoccurs inAsiaand isdominatedbyChina,withaproductionof300
metric tons in 2010, accounting formore than half of theworld’s total production of 574 tonnes of
primary indium (Table A34). Belgium is reported by USGS as the only European country producing
indium,refiningitfromimportedleadandzinc.AccordingtoUSGS,withaproductionof30tonnesoutof
theworld totalof574 tonnes,Belgium represented5%of the indiumworld supply in2010.However
Nyrstar’szincfacilityinAuby(France)isalsoknowntoproduceindiumofabout30to40tonnesp.a.dIn
addition to primary production, there is also a substantial capacity for recycling the metal, as
approximately 70% of the indium contained in the main product, indium tin oxide (ITO), can be
recoveredandrefinedforreͲuse.eTherecyclingofindium,usedintheformofITOinliquidcrystaldisplay
(LCD) flatͲpanel screens, takes place mainly in China, Japan and Korea. The ÖkoͲInstitut reported
secondaryproductionof600tonnesfor2009,against786reportedbytheIndiumCorporation.fDespite










Indium does not occur reclusively but as a minor metal in combination with other minerals.
Commercially,“virgin”indiumisextractedprimarilyasabyͲproductoforesofzinc,lead,copperandtin.
Almostall indium isproducedfromresiduescollectedfromzincrefiningandrecyclingoffluedustsand
gases generatedduring the smeltingof zinc. The remainder, if any, isderived from the smelting and
refiningoftin.Themostwidespreadapplicationtorecoverindiumisduringthezincproductionprocess.
Around0.028kgbyͲproductindiumcanberecoveredfrom1tonneofzincore.g

























































































































































China 57 84.6 9.0 6.8 7.9 6.1 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.2 3.3
SouthKorea 153 41.6 4.0 3.5 4.1 5.0 2.4 2.1 4.1 2.2 2.7 1.4 3.6 6.5
Japan 164 31.2 4.2 1.1 3.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.0 1.2 3.4 2.0 2.0 3.9









































































China 36.8 5.2 29.7 58.1 46.2 45.3 36.2
SouthKorea 72.2 68.2 52.4 83.3 75.2 82.5 71.4
Japan 84.5 81.0 83.5 86.7 81.0 88.2 87.1




flotation process is used to concentrate the copper, which is further processed by sintering and
electrothermicreductiontoproduceacrudebullion.Electrolytictreatmentofthebulliongeneratesan




















Future demand from the electronics industrywill put severe pressure on supply. Indium supply and
demandforecastsaregiveninFigureA17.Themarketisforecasttomovefromasmallsurplusin2010to




































resistance to corrosion and a low coefficientof thermalexpansion.Due to itsunique combinationof
properties, fewmetalscansubstitutemolybdenum,especiallyasanalloyingelement incast ironsand








estimated600,000 tonnesofmolybdenum reserves are reported tobepresent atNordli inNorway.a
IdentifiedresourcesofmolybdenumintheUnitedStatesamounttoabout5.4milliontonnes,andinthe


































China,United States and Chile are the leading producing countries formolybdenum, being together
responsibleforroughly80%ofworldsupply in2009.PoliticalriskforEuropeansupplyofmolybdenum
stemmainly from its total importdependenceand theconcentratednatureofglobalsupply,although























































































































































China 57 84.6 9.0 6.8 7.9 6.1 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.2 3.3
UnitedStates 159 34.0 3.1 3.7 3.3 1.0 5.3 2.9 3.0 2.3 4.0 1.4 2.5 1.5





































































China 36.8 5.2 29.7 58.1 46.2 45.3 36.2
UnitedStates 83.4 86.3 59.0 89.0 89.5 91.5 85.2




Molybdenumoccursastheprincipalmetalsulphide in large lowͲgradeporphyryͲmolybdenumdeposits
andasanassociatedmetalsulphideinlowͲgradeporphyryͲcopperdeposits.Itisminedbothasaprimary
product and as a byͲproduct of coppermines. Themost importantmolybdenum ore ismolybdenite,
whichiscommonlyfoundwithcoppersulphides.Roastingplantsthenconvertmolybdeniteconcentrate






element in the steel, iron and superͲalloy industry. The remainingmolybdenum isused for catalysts,




Molybdenum supply and demand forecasts are given in Figure A20.a Based on the existing mine





exceeding existing supply somewhere around themiddle of the next decade.However, based on an










x A steady growth inmolybdenum demand driven by higher steel consumption over the
nextdecade(asforecastbyRoskill)






























air and thereforemust be either stored under oil or cast in plastic. If it stays exposed to the air,
neodymiumwillquicklyoxidizeandtheoxidelayerswillfalloffexposingthemetaltofurtheroxidation.It
hashighmagneticstrengthsespeciallyat low temperaturesand isused inhighperformancemagnets.
















There is currently no neodymium production in Europe and quantitative estimates for European
neodymium reservesarenotavailable.However, it is reported that rareearthelement resources, i.e.

































madeoutof theseoxides)and tightenedexportquotasprogressively since2004.aFurther restrictions









































































































































































































Althoughneodymium isclassedasarareearthelement it iswidelydistributed intheEarth’scrustwith
anabundanceof38ppmmaking it the26thmostabundantelement.b Itneverappearsnaturally in its
metallicformandisalwaysaccompaniedbyotherrareearthelementsandcanbefoundinoreminerals
such asmonazite and bastnaesitewith 10 to 18% of thesemischmetals comprising of neodymium.




Themain application for neodymium is as an alloy in high strength neodymiumͲironͲboron (NdFeB)
magnets–thestrongestpermanentmagnetscurrentlyavailable(typicallycontaining28%ofneodymium
by weight).c These magnets are used in generators, for example in wind turbines (included within
“Motor” inFigureA22)orelectricmotors forhybridcars;smallermagnetsareused incomputerhard
discs,microphones, loudspeakersor inͲearheadphones (FigureA22).Growth rates in thedemand for
rareearthelements inpermanentmagnetshasbeenverystrong, increasingfrom5,500tonnes in2003



























x Neodymium content remains constant at 16.2% of rare earth element supply, but
demandrepresents17.1%asforecastfor2014byIMCOA




Due to bullish demand, severe tightening of Chinese export quotas and continued uncertainty about
China’s future policy course, prices for neodymium oxide climbed considerably over the year 2010,
reachingnearlyUS$90/kgby late2010(FigureA24a)andescalatingrapidlybyover200%to$300/kg in
the first half of 2011 alone (Figure A24b).Despite new production capacity being expected to come



































In 2010, 1.55million tonnes of nickelwere produced. Russia, theworld’s largest supplier, produced
265,000tonnesofnickel;followedbyIndonesia,Philippines,Canada,AustraliaandNewCaledonia.These
six countriesaccount together for70%ofworldproduction.Nickel reserveswereestimated tobe76
milliontonnes,ofwhich24milliontonnesarelocatedinAustralia.Globalnickelresourcesareestimated













































































































































































Russia 71 80.8 7.0 5.9 7.5 6.2 8.1 4.6 8.0 5.7 8.3 6.9 8.0 4.6
Indonesia 62 84.1 7.3 6.7 6.3 7.2 8.1 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.3 7.3 6.9






































































Russia 26.5 22.3 21.7 44.8 35.2 23.6 11.4
Indonesia 39.0 48.3 24.1 46.7 42.9 34.4 28.1

















stainless steelproductionwhich accounts for70%.About11%ofnickel isused as an alloywithnonͲ
ferrous metals and the remaining 19% are used in plating, especially in medical equipment and





























recession.Priceshaverecoveredconsiderablysinceandtheupwardtrend is likelytocontinueearly in
thedecadeassmallmarketdeficitspersist.Pricepressureisthenlikelytoeasetowardsthemiddleofthe
























Brazil isby farthe leadingproducerofniobium. In2009,thetwoworld’s largestdepositofpyrochlore
locatedinAraxáandCatalão,Brazil,produced58,000tonnesor92%oftheworld’sproduction,whichthe




are 46,000 tonnes. However, according to the TantalumͲNiobium International Study Center, “the
reserves[ofniobium]areenoughtosupplycurrentworlddemandforabout500years;about460million
tons”.bCurrently, there isnoniobiumproduction inEuropebutaneconomicdepositofabout20,000



















Niobium’s abundance in the Earth’s crust is 20 ppm and it is primarily obtained from themineral
pyrochlore,butalsofromcolumbiteandtantalumͲbearingores:however,only10to15%oftheniobium
industry obtains its niobium from tantalum ores.e Niobium is also found in small quantities in slags













































































































































Brazil 113 69.1 6.4 3.9 6.4 5.0 8.9 4.1 6.4 6.0 5.6 6.9 5.1 4.4





































































Brazil 55.8 62.1 54.2 57.6 55.2 49.5 56.2














bedrivenby thegrowingconsumptionof ferroͲniobium (FeNb) inadvancedmetallurgicalapplications
(HighStrengthAlloySteelͲHSLA).Tomeetsuchincreasingdemand,existingniobiumproducers–most
importantly theBraziliancompanyCBMM–havedeclared theywillbeable tograduallyexpand their
productioncapacity.Suchexpansion is forecasttoreach its limit in2012.However, increasingniobium












x Niobiumdemandwillbedrivenbyand follow the samegrowth rateof thedemand for
FeNbinthesteelindustry





Prices for ferroͲniobiumhavebeen stableover recent years at around$40/lb,having increased from

































Smallamountsof seleniumare considered tobebeneficial for thehumanbodybut it canbe toxic in
largerquantities.Themetalisthe69thmostabundantelementonEarthanditisrarelyfoundinitspure
state but often as a compound of other ores. Isolated selenium occurs in several different forms, of
which adense purplishͲgrey, semiͲmetal form is themost stableone. Selenium iswell known for its





seleniumof3,000 to3,500 tonnes,although the sourceofmuchof thisproduction isnot known.a In
2010, the largestknownproducerwas Japan, followedbyGermany,who togetherproducedca.1,460
tonnes. RussiaandChileholdmostoftheglobalseleniumreserveswith20,000tonneseachofatotal
world reserveestimated tobe88,000 tonnes. In2010, theEU27accounted forat least945 tonnesof





















































There are no significant political risks threatening the supply chain for selenium as production is

































































































































Japan 164 31.2 4.2 1.1 3.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.0 1.2 3.4 2.0 2.0 3.9
Germany 157 36.2 3.5 3.9 4.9 2.8 4.9 3.2 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.4










































































Japan 84.6 81.0 83.5 86.7 81.0 88.2 87.1
Germany 90.1 93.8 76.9 91.9 92.4 92.9 92.9




Selenium isnever found as apuremetal innature and iswidelydistributedwithin the Earth’s crust.
Selenium’s estimated overall abundance in the Earth’s crust ranges from 0.03Ͳ0.08 ppm.a It most
commonlyoccurs in sulphidesof copper, ironand leadand isobtainedasabyͲproductof theirores.
About90%bofprimaryseleniumisrecoveredfromanodeslimesgeneratedintheelectrolyticrefiningof
copper. “The seleniumͲcontaining slimes averaged 7% selenium byweight,with a few containing as







selenium is being used in glass manufacturing mainly to decolorize the green tint caused by iron
impurities in container glass. About 30% are used in electronics with a main focus on thinͲfilm
photovoltaiccopper indiumgalliumdiselenide(CIGS)solarcellsandonlysomeselenium isusedonthe
replacementdrums forolderplainpaperphotocopiers. Inmetallurgy it isused,amongstothers,asan
















Selenium supply and demand forecasts are shown in Figure A34. Putting together USGS production
estimates of 3,250 tonnes per year and current demand estimates from Global Industry Analysts of
2,800tonnesper year;a then a surplusof seleniumexists.This surplus is set tonarrowover thenext
decade,movingthemarket intobalanceby2020.Prices forseleniumpeakedaboveUS$50/lb in2005,
althoughthegeneralpatternofpriceshasbeenarangeofUS$15Ͳ50/lboverrecentyears(FigureA35).



































being theworld’s leading producers of silver, due to the fact that silver ismainly obtained as a byͲ












































Silver production is fairly widespread throughout the world. Key suppliers such as Peru, China and
































































































































Peru 92 77.1 6.6 4.5 6.4 7.3 8.2 5.6 6.9 6.3 5.5 7.2 6.9 5.7
Mexico 98 75.4 7.0 4.3 5.9 7.0 8.2 6.1 6.8 6.0 5.5 7.0 5.0 6.6








































































Peru 41.8 50.2 17.9 43.3 63.8 30.2 45.2
Mexico 46,8 53.6 22.2 60.5 61.0 34.0 49.0










sulphideoreminerals from thenonͲsulphideminerals.The twominerals are then separatedby froth
flotation.“Inthisprocess,thesulphideparticles,whicharehydrophobic,adherepreferentiallytoafroth




The largest amount of silver is used for nonͲindustrial and decorative purposes, such as jewellery,
silverwareor coins accounting formore thanoneͲthird. Today, the industrialusesof silver (including
photography), account for twoͲthirds ofworld silver consumption. About 24% of all silver is used in



















Silverprices inrecentyearshavemirroredthestrongprice increasesseen ingold,withpricesrisingto
US$30/ounceattheendof2010andrisingsignificantlyin2011,asinvestorshavesoughtsecurityfrom
currency risksamid theuncertaintiesassociatedwith theEuroͲzonesovereigndebtcrises.Priceshave
peakedatUS$48/ounce,beforefallingbacktoUS$35/ounce.Suchspeculativepricemovesduetosilver’s


























times rarer than platinum in the earth’s crust, is closely associatedwith selenium, its periodic table




Due to secrecy,officialdataon the telluriumproduction areonly available for a few states. In2010,





















































































































































































Japan 164 31.2 4.2 1.1 3.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.0 1.2 3.4 2.0 2.0 3.9
Russia 71 80.8 7.0 5.9 7.5 6.2 8.1 4.6 8.0 5.7 8.3 6.9 8.0 4.6
Peru 92 77.1 6.6 4.5 6.4 7.3 8.2 5.6 6.9 6.3 5.5 7.2 6.9 5.7






































































Japan 84.6 81.0 83.5 86.7 81.0 88.2 87.1
Russia 26.5 22.3 21.7 44.8 35.2 23.6 11.4
Peru 41.8 50.2 17.9 43.3 63.8 30.2 45.2







produced from anode slimes collected from electrolytic copper refining and the remainder isderived






it improvesmachining characteristics.About37% isused inphotovoltaicandelectronics for cadmium
telluride(CdTe)solarpanels,aswellasinCDs,DVDsand‘phasechange’memorychips.Afurther21%of
telluriumisusedinchemicalsandpharmaceuticals.Industrially,telluriumisusedincatalystsandinthe


















Prices for tellurium almost doubled in 2010, rising from US$150/kg to near US$300/kg, and have
increased significantly in2011,peakingatUS$425/ouncebefore fallingback tobelowUS$400/ounce.
Given theextremely largedemanddeficits thatarebeingprojected for thecomingdecade,significant
upwardpressureonpricesistobeexpected.
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of themare located insouthͲeasternAsia,Australia,Bolivia,Brazil,ChinaandRussia.According to the
ITRI,approximately20%of tinworldproductioncomes from secondary tin representingan important







































































































































































China 57 84.6 9.0 6.8 7.9 6.1 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.2 3.3
Indonesia 62 84.1 7.3 6.7 6.3 7.2 8.1 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.3 7.3 6.9





































































China 36.8 5.2 29.7 58.1 46.2 45.3 36.2
Indonesia 39.0 48.3 24.1 46.7 42.9 34.4 28.1











According to ITRI, electronic solder accounted for 52% of all refined tin usage in 2009. Due to tin’s















Tinsupplyanddemand forecastsaregiven inFigureA44.Themarket is forecast to remain roughly in
balance until 2020 based on the longͲterm growth indicated in the production and consumption of
refinedtinindicatedinforecastsfromtheEconomistIntelligenceUnit.

Prices for tin peaked at around US$23,000/t in July 2008 and more recently in 2010 at around
US$27,000/t,havingfallenofftoaroundUS$10,000/t inthe interveningperiod(FigureA45).Giventhe
currenttightmarkets,afurtherupwardtrendinpricesistobeexpected,whichislikelytogetreinforced



















Vanadium (V) isasoft,silverͲgrey,ductile transitionmetalwhich ischemicallysimilar to tantalumand
niobium.Vanadiumisthe17thmostcommonelementonearthandisusedprimarilyasasteelhardener
andstrengtheningagentimpartingtoughnessandwearresistance.Addingsmallamountsofvanadiumto







andRussiaandanother3.5million tonnes inSouthAfrica.With reservesaddingup toa totalof13.6
million tonnesworldwide, the demand of vanadium can bemet for at least another century at the
presentrateofconsumption.ThereisnovanadiumproductioninEurope,abutapproximately600,000tof





























contain vanadium.About43%of vanadiumproduction comes frommineralsandonly1% isobtained
fromreprocessedcatalysts.
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China 57 84.6 9.0 6.8 7.9 6.1 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.2 3.3
SouthAfrica 122 67.4 8.4 7.4 5.3 4.3 8.5 4.6 5.5 5.7 4.5 4.3 5.9 3.0





































































China 36.8 5.2 29.7 58.1 46.2 45.3 36.2
SouthAfrica 59.8 66.4 44.3 67.6 64.3 56.1 60.5




Justover90%ofvanadium’scurrentproduction isusedasahardeningagent insteeland ironusedfor
toolsorautomobilesaddingstrengthandreliabilitytothematerial.Vanadiumalloysenablesteeltobe
usedeffectivelyatextremesofbothhighandlowtemperature.TitaniumͲaluminiumͲvanadiumalloysare









A strong rise invanadiumdemandwillbeonlypartlydrivenbya steadygrowth in steeldemand (6%
averageannualgrowth for steeland8%averageannualgrowth forHigh steel).aNewapplications for
vanadiumhavebeenrecentlydiscoveredandnonͲmetallurgicalusageofvanadium isnowrisingatthe
samerateasGDP.Thesupplyprojectionspresented inFigureA47mustbeconsideredasoptimisticas
they assume that all currently planned vanadium projects will come on stream tomeet increasing








x LiͲionbatteryuse isapotentialstrongdriver fornewdemand;Li3V2(PO4)3 isthehighest
voltage,highestenergycathodeidentifiedforLiͲionbatteries
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bottleneck to the deployment of lowͲcarbon energy technologies. In order to assess whether such




thedeploymentof the technologies inEuropebetween2020and2030.Thedemandofeachmetal is
compared to the respective globalproduction volume in2010.This ratio (expressed as apercentage)
allowscomparingtherelativestressthatthedeploymentofthesixtechnologiesinEuropeisexpectedto





anticipated demand by analysing in detail the likelihood of rapid future global demand growth,
limitations to expanding supply in the short tomedium term, and the concentration of supply and
political risksassociatedwithkeysuppliers.The reportpinpoints5of the14metals tobeathigh risk,
namely:therareearthmetalsneodymiumanddysprosium,andthebyͲproducts(fromtheprocessingof
othermetals)indium,telluriumandgallium.Thereportexploresasetofpotentialmitigationstrategies,
ranging fromexpandingEuropeanoutput, increasingrecyclingandreusetoreducingwasteand finding
substitutes for thesemetals in theirmain applications. A number of recommendations are provided
whichinclude:







x raising awareness and engaging in an activedialoguewith zinc, copper and aluminium refiners
overbyͲproductrecovery,
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